COUNTRY JOE STEVENS, AKA Singing Horse v. Howard Skolnik;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
COUNTRY JOE STEVENS, AKA
Singing Horse,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
HOWARD SKOLNIK; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 14-16146
D.C. No. 3:09-cv-00227-RCJ-
WGC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 25, 2015**
Before: McKEOWN, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Nevada state prisoner Country Joe Stevens, aka Singing Horse, appeals pro
se from the district court’s summary judgment in his action under the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”) and 42 U.S.C.
FILED
SEP 08 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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§ 1983 alleging violations in connection with the confiscation and destruction of
his property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Stevens’s
RLUIPA claim because Stevens failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as
to whether the prison regulation requiring him to store religious property in a
labeled box with an inventory form, and defendant Bauman’s enforcement of the
policy, substantially burdened his ability to exercise his religion. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc–1(a)(1)-(2); Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005)
(prisoner has initial burden to demonstrate that prison policies “constitute a
substantial burden on the exercise of his religious beliefs”); Warsoldier, 418 F.3d
at 996 (prison policy imposes substantial burden when it “intentionally puts
significant pressure on inmates . . . to abandon their religious beliefs”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Stevens’s First
Amendment claim because Stevens failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether the regulations were reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests, and whether the regulations applied to his possessions. See Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Stevens’s equal
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protection claim because Stevens failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether Bauman intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of race
or religion. See Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 1997) (a § 1983
plaintiff must show that officials intentionally acted in a discriminatory manner to
establish an equal protection), abrogated on other grounds as stated in Shakur, 514
F.3d at 884-85; see also Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637
F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th Cir. 2011) (“To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must
set forth non-speculative evidence of specific facts, not sweeping conclusory
allegations.”).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
We reject Stevens’s contention that the magistrate judge and district court
judge were biased against him.
AFFIRMED.
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