Russell Dwayne Rodgers v. Greg Munks;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RUSSELL DWAYNE RODGERS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
GREG MUNKS; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 14-15167
D.C. No. 3:13-cv-02116-MEJ
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Maria-Elena James, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted July 21, 2015***
Before: CANBY, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges
San Mateo County jail inmate Russell Dwayne Rodgers appeals pro se from
the district court’s judgment dismissing for failure to exhaust administrative
FILED
JUL 31 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
*** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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remedies his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Eighth Amendment claims arising
from the alleged failure to supply hygiene supplies. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir.
2014) (en banc). We affirm.
The district court properly concluded that Rodgers failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies because Rodgers did not appeal the relevant grievance
decision to the final level of review before presenting his claims to the district
court. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85, 93-95 (2006) (holding that “proper
exhaustion” is mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural
rules).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Rodgers’s motions
for appointment of counsel because Rodgers did not demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting
forth standard of review and exceptional circumstances requirement).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Rodgers’s motions
to compel discovery responses because Rodgers failed to establish that the denial
caused substantial prejudice. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir.
2002) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a district court’s
decision to deny discovery “will not be disturbed except upon the clearest showing
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that denial of discovery results in actual and substantial prejudice to the
complaining litigant” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We reject Rodgers’s contentions regarding judicial bias and the district
court’s alleged failure to allow him further discovery.
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal, or matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening
brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Rodgers’s motion for the entry of default and request for appointment of
counsel, filed on April 20, 2015, are denied.
Appellees’s motion for an extension of time, filed on April 30, 2015, is
denied as moot.
AFFIRMED.
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