Phillip Eugene Sanders v. Magic Metro Tactical Team;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PHILLIP EUGENE SANDERS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MAGIC METRO TACTICAL TEAM; et
al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 13-17285
D.C. No. 1:13-cv-01405-AWI-
SAB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 21, 2015**
Before: CANBY, BEA, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Phillip Eugene Sanders appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims arising
out of his arrest, and subsequent state court criminal proceedings. We have
FILED
JUL 31 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Watison v. Carter, 668
F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii));
Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Sanders’s claims against the police
officers as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because success on
these claims would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his conviction, and
Sanders failed to allege facts sufficient to show its invalidation. See id. at 486-87
(§ 1983 claims that necessarily challenge the fact or duration of confinement are
barred unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated); see also Guerrero
v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 703-04 (9th Cir. 2006) (Heck barred claims of former
prisoner where success on those claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of
his conviction and where habeas relief was not timely sought).
The district court properly dismissed Sanders’s claims against the public
defenders and legal staff because these defendants are not state actors subject to
liability under § 1983. See Miranda v. Clark County, Nev., 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th
Cir. 2003) (en banc) (a public defender is not a state actor under § 1983); Simmons
v. Sacramento Cnty. Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (private
parties do not generally act under color of state law for § 1983 purposes).
13-17285 2

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The district court properly dismissed Sanders’s claims against the state court
judges and commissioner because these defendants are immune from liability for
damages under § 1983. See Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir.
1995) (commissioner was entitled to judicial immunity from damages liability for
claims arising out of official acts or the performance of judge-like functions);
Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Judges and those
performing judge-like functions are absolutely immune from damage liability for
acts performed in their official capacities.”).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
13-17285 3

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