In re: GAREGIN PAPAZOV v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: GAREGIN PAPAZOV,
Debtor,
ELIZABETH GOLDENBERG, Trustee,
Appellant,
v.
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST
CO.,
Appellee.
No. 13-60086
BAP No. 12-1584
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Kirscher, Dunn, and Clement, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding
Submitted July 9, 2015 **
Pasadena, California
Before: REINHARDT, TASHIMA, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
FILED
JUL 29 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Trustee Elizabeth Goldenberg appeals the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s
denial of her motion to reopen debtor Garegin Papazov’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy
case. We affirm.
Appellant lacks Article III standing because she has not suffered an injury in
fact. See Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Serv., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 273 (2008).
Appellant had no legal relationship with Papazov, was not negatively affected by
Papazov’s bankruptcy case, and suffered no perceivable injury in fact. Even
assuming that Appellant had standing, we would affirm.
Appellant claims she is a party in interest capable of reopening Papazov’s
bankruptcy case under 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 5010 (“Bankruptcy Rule 5010”). Appellant’s argument fails on two
alternative grounds.
First, Appellant lacked standing to reopen Papazov’s bankruptcy case as a
party in interest. Bankruptcy Rule 5010 allows a debtor or other party in interest to
reopen a bankruptcy case under § 350(b), but the provision does not define party in
interest. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 5010; 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) (2015). We look instead to
11 U.S.C. § 1109(b), which identifies a party in interest as “the debtor, the trustee,
a creditors’ committee, an equity security holders’ committee, a creditor, an equity
security holder, or any indenture trustee.” 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (2015). The
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§ 1109(b) list is not exclusive, and “courts must determine on a case by case basis
whether the prospective party has a sufficient stake in the proceedings so as to
require representation.” Motor Vehicle Cas. Co. v. Thorpe Insulation Co. (In re
Thorpe Insulation Co.), 677 F.3d 869, 884 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing In re Amatex
Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1042 (3rd Cir. 1985)).
Appellant was not Papazov’s debtor, trustee, creditors’ committee, equity
security holders’ committee, creditor, equity security holder, or indentured trustee.
§ 1109(b). Appellant was not otherwise included within the term party in interest
because she lacked a sufficient stake in Papazov’s bankruptcy proceeding. In re
Thorpe Insulation Co., 677 F.3d at 884. The 8383 Grand View Drive property was
subject to foreclosure due to the default in payments on the Lukashin note. That
property was owned by the Goldenberg Family Trust both before and after the
filing of Papazov’s bankruptcy petition. It was not owned by Papazov. His
bankruptcy should have had no impact on that property or any other rights of
Appellant. Specifically, the order granting the motion for relief from the automatic
stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 (“Order”) never affected Appellant because there was
no automatic stay in place from which relief was required. Appellant’s only
perceivable grievance is that Deutsche Bank National Trust Company may have
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exaggerated the scope of the Order in a California state court proceeding, but that
could properly be dealt with by the state court.
Second, Appellant may not reopen Papazov’s bankruptcy case under
§ 350(b) because it was never closed pursuant to § 350(a). See 11 U.S.C. § 350
(2015); Armel Laminates, Inc. v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Income Property
Builders, Inc.), 699 F.2d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that a bankruptcy case
may not be reopened under § 350(b) unless it was closed, as opposed to dismissed,
under § 350(a)). As such, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel properly dismissed
Appellant’s claim. Appellant has not contested this alternative ground of dismissal
and has therefore waived the issue.
AFFIRMED.
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