Ignacio Gonzalez Quinonez v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
IGNACIO GONZALEZ QUINONEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 11-74022
Agency No. A090-054-039
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 8, 2015 **
Pasadena, California
Before: W. FLETCHER, PAEZ, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
Ignacio Gonzalez Quinonez petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’s (BIA) decision finding him removable for having been convicted of two
crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), and an
aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), and
FILED
JUL 24 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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pretermitting his applications for cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), and
under former section 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c). We deny the petition.
1. As the government concedes, the BIA’s pretermission of 212(c) relief
based on the lack of a “statutory counterpart in the grounds of inadmissability” was
erroneous. See Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011).
2. Remand would be futile. Gonzalez admitted that he had been convicted
in 2009 for a violation of California Penal Code § 422 and in 2011 for a violation
of California Penal Code § 647(b). The Immigration Judge (IJ) found the
convictions established by clear and convincing evidence, and Gonzalez did not
challenge that conclusion before the BIA.
We have held that convictions under both statutes are categorically CIMTs.
See Rohit v. Holder, 670 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2012); Latter-Singh v. Holder, 668
F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, even without relying on the 1993 conviction
at all, Gonzalez is removable for having committed two CIMTs.
Gonzalez is ineligible for relief from that ground of removability. First,
because both convictions were entered after April 1, 1997, even if Gonzalez were
granted 212(c) relief, it would not waive this ground of removability. Matter of
Abdelghany, 26 I. & N. Dec. 254, 261 (BIA 2014). Second, Gonzalez is ineligible
for cancellation, both because he was previously convicted of an aggravated
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felony, see Becker v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 1000, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2007), and
because, in order to avoid being separately removable for the aggravated felony, he
would need to obtain 212(c) relief, which would foreclose also seeking
cancellation, see Garcia-Jimenez v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 1082, 1085-86 (9th Cir.
2007).
Neither the IJ nor the BIA held that the 2011 conviction was a CIMT. No
remand is necessary, however, because that question has been settled by Rohit. See
Medina-Lara v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1106, 1117 (9th Cir. 2014).
PETITION DENIED.
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