KRISTINA M. DENNIS, AKA Kristina M. Hilditch v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security Administration

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KRISTINA M. DENNIS, AKA Kristina
M. Hilditch,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of Social Security Administration,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 13-35840
D.C. No. 6:12-cv-00417-CL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Owen M. Panner, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 8, 2015 **
Portland, Oregon
Before: N.R. SMITH and OWENS, Circuit Judges and HAYES,*** District Judge.
FILED
JUL 14 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable William Q. Hayes, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.

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Kristina Dennis appeals the district court’s order, affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Dennis challenges the
Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) decision, arguing that the ALJ (1) failed to
follow the Appeals Council’s remand order; (2) failed to properly address Dennis’s
mental impairments under Step Two; and (3) failed to address transferability of
skills under Step Five. Because the ALJ’s findings are not based on legal error and
are supported by substantial evidence, we affirm. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d
1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999).
1. The ALJ did not fail to follow the Appeals Council’s remand order. As
instructed, the ALJ recontacted Dr. Birchard, requesting and receiving additional
records from her. The remand order does not require the ALJ specifically address
the new documents or alter its previous decision. The ALJ also had a medical
expert testify. Dennis argues that, because the medical expert was equivocal in his
testimony, he was not a proper witness, and the matter should be remanded to have
a qualified expert testify. There is no merit to this position. The medical expert
was only equivocal about whether Dennis met any listing, because there was no
objective medical evidence to support her claims.
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2. The ALJ did not err at Step Two in concluding that Dennis’s mental
impairment was not severe. Dennis argues that the ALJ failed to properly address
her mental impairment as required under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a. We disagree.
The ALJ provided a specific finding with regard to Dennis’s degree of limitation in
each of the required functional areas. § 404.1520a(e)(4). See Hoopai v. Astrue,
499 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2007) (as long as the ALJ’s decision rated and
assessed the claimant’s limitations in the four functional areas, additional “more
specific findings” were not necessary).
3. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Dennis could
perform semi-skilled work in the national economy at Step Five. The ALJ found
that Dennis’s past work was not performed at a Substantial Gainful Activity level,
and thus, she had no past relevant work. Dennis argues the ALJ erred in
concluding that Dennis could perform semi-skilled work, because she had no
transferable skills. But, the ALJ correctly concluded that “[t]ransferability of job
skills [wa]s not an issue.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404 app. 2 § 202.13; SSR 82-41. As
required, the ALJ considered Dennis’s residual functional capacity, age (a younger
individual, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c)), education (high school graduate), and
work experience (part-time beautician) in conjunction with the Medical-Vocational
Rules for guidance. 20 C.F.R. § 404 app. 2 § 200.00(a). The Grid listings in 20
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C.F.R. § 404 app. 2 support a conclusion that persons, such as Dennis (with her age
and education), cannot rely on a lack of transferable skills to overrule an
unfavorable disability determination. Further, even assuming that the ALJ erred in
not making specific findings with regard to Dennis’s transferable skills, any error
was harmless. See Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991). The
ALJ specifically asked the vocational expert about Dennis’s transferable skills.
The vocational expert testified that, even though Dennis’s past work was part time,
the skills she learned as a beautician were experienced over such an extended
period of time so as to qualify as transferable work skills. The vocational expert
identified the specific skills that Dennis acquired through her work as a beautician
and explained how those skills would transfer to the identified semi-skilled jobs.
Thus, any failure on the ALJ to specifically identify transferable skills was
harmless, because it was “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability
determination.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012).
AFFIRMED.
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