LAUREN PAULSON, Attorney v. Oregon State Bar;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LAUREN PAULSON, Attorney,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
OREGON STATE BAR; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 13-35672
D.C. No. 6:13-cv-00175-AA
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Ann L. Aiken, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 22, 2015**
Before: LEAVY, HAWKINS, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Lauren Paulson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action challenging the constitutionality of the Oregon State
Bar’s disciplinary proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
FILED
JUL 14 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument, see Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2), and therefore denies Paulson’s
request for oral argument, set forth in his opening brief.

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review de novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). We
affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Paulson’s claims for damages against
Oregon Supreme Court Chief Justice Thomas Balmer, and the Oregon State Bar
and its prosecutor, Jeff Sapiro, because these defendants are entitled to immunity.
See Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2007) (state officials sued in
their official capacities are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Hirsh v.
Justices of Supreme Court of Cal., 67 F.3d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1995) (a state bar
association is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and state bar prosecutors
are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075
(9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (“Judges and those performing judge-like functions are
absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed in their official
capacities.”).
Paulson is no longer a member of the Oregon State Bar and does not seek
reinstatement in this appeal. Thus, the district court properly dismissed Paulson’s
requests for declaratory and injunctive relief because he lacked standing. See
Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 679 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth the
requirements for Article III standing); see also Canatella v. California, 304 F.3d
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843, 852 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In the particular context of injunctive and declaratory
relief, a plaintiff must show that he has suffered or is threatened with a concrete
and particularized legal harm . . . coupled with a sufficient likelihood that he will
again be wronged in a similar way.” (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The district court properly dismissed Paulson’s class action claims because
his individual claims failed. See Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350
F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003) (failure to establish individual case or controversy
precludes litigant from serving as class representative).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Paulson’s motion
for recusal because Paulson failed to establish any basis for recusal. See United
States v. Johnson, 610 F.3d 1138, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth standard
of review and discussing grounds for recusal).
Paulson’s request for appointment of an out-of-circuit judge in this appeal,
set forth in his opening brief, is denied. See In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales
Practices Litig., 711 F.3d 1050, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Only severe or
unexpected over-burdening, as happens when a judge dies or retires,when the
district is experiencing a judicial emergency or when all the judges are recused
because of a conflict, will warrant bringing in a visiting judge.”).
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Paulson’s requests for judicial notice, set forth in his opening brief, are
denied.
Appellees’ motion for judicial notice is granted.
We do not consider facts or documents not presented to the district court
below. See United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents
or facts not presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).
We do not consider issues or arguments not specifically and distinctly raised
and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th
Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
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