Joel Diaz-Arango v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOEL DIAZ-ARANGO,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 13-72544
Agency No. A079-149-303
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 22, 2015**
Before: HAWKINS, GRABER, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Joel Diaz-Arango, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration
judge’s order denying his application for cancellation of removal. We have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the
FILED
JUN 30 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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agency’s continuous physical presence determination. Serrano Gutierrez v.
Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 2008). We deny the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Diaz-
Arango’s voluntary return to Mexico interrupted his period of continuous physical
presence, where Diaz-Arango does not dispute that he signed a voluntary return
form that stated that was giving up the right to a hearing before an immigration
judge, the record shows that this form was read to him in Spanish, and Diaz-
Arango testified that he relied on an attorney’s advice in accepting voluntary return
to Mexico. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A); Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d
614, 619-20 (9th Cir. 2006) (in order to interrupt the accumulation of continuous
physical presence, the decision to accept voluntary return in lieu of a hearing
before an immigration judge must be knowing and voluntary).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
13-72544 2

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