K. B., a minor, by and through her guardian ad litem, Natalina Kanteiko; v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Company, a New Jersey corporation

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
K. B., a minor, by and through her
guardian ad litem, Natalina Kanteiko; et
al.,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
HARTFORD CASUALTY INSURANCE
COMPANY, a New Jersey corporation,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 13-55511
D.C. No. 3:11-cv-01389-BEN-
WVG
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 1, 2015
Pasadena, California
Before: M. SMITH and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges and LAMBERTH,** Senior
District Judge.
FILED
JUN 24 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The Honorable Royce C. Lamberth, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia, sitting by designation.

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1. The district court did not err by granting summary judgment to Hartford
Casualty Insurance Company, finding that it had no duty to defend Kurt and Anne
Redlinger under their Hartford business insurance policy, in a personal injury
lawsuit between K.B. and the Redlingers wherein K.B. suffered severe injuries
after nearly drowning in the Redlingers’ pool at a birthday party at their home.
Whether Hartford owed a duty to defend to the Redlingers “is made in the first
instance by comparing the allegations of the complaint with the terms of the
policy.” Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Cal.
1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). We also look at known “[f]acts extrinsic
to the complaint” to determine whether “they reveal a possibility that the claim
may be covered by the policy.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, neither the complaint nor the extrinsic facts revealed a possibility that
the underlying claim could be covered by this business insurance policy. Hartford
insured the Redlinger’s rental property business located in El Cajon. None of the
information provided to Hartford suggested that the Redlingers were conducting
their rental business from their Cibola property (where the accident occurred). To
the contrary, all the information submitted to Hartford was directed instead at the
Redlingers’ personal liability or the liability of their Sun-Pro business. Thus, the
facts known to Hartford at the time of the tender did not trigger a duty to defend.
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See Gunderson v. Fire Ins. Exch., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 272, 277 (Ct. App. 1995) (“An
insured may not trigger the duty to defend by speculating about extraneous ‘facts’
regarding potential liability or ways in which the third party claimant might amend
its complaint at some future date. This approach misconstrues the principle of
‘potential liability’ under an insurance policy.”).
Hartford “made an informed decision on the basis of the third party
complaint and the extrinsic facts known to it at the time of tender that there is no
potential for coverage.” Id. Thus, it did not “have a continuing duty to investigate
whether there is a potential for coverage.” Id.
2. The district court did not err in finding Hartford had no duty to indemnify.
“It is well settled that because the duty to defend is broader than the duty to
indemnify, a determination that there is no duty to defend automatically means that
there is no duty to indemnify.” Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London v.
Superior Court, 16 P.3d 94, 104 (Cal. 2001) (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted).
AFFIRMED.
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