Paula Ramsum, an unmarried person v. Walter Frenzel

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PAULA RAMSUM, an unmarried person,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
WALTER FRENZEL; JANE DOE
FRENZEL; JPMORGAN CHASE BANK,
NA, successor to Washington Mutual
Bank,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 13-35371
D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01152-RSM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ricardo S. Martinez, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 1, 2015
Seattle, Washington
Before: O’SCANNLAIN, TASHIMA, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
Paula Ramsum appeals the district court decision dismissing her action for
judicial foreclosure against property in Whatcom County, Washington, that was
formerly owned by her ex-husband.
FILED
JUN 16 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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We review de novo dismissals under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Wilson v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012). In light of the
Washington statutes at issue in this case, we affirm. See Wash. Rev. Code
§§ 4.64.030, 65.04.045, 65.04.047, 26.18.020, 26.18.055, 26.21.480, 26.21.490.
Because Ramsum did not identify or describe her ex-husband’s former property in
the documents she filed with the Whatcom County Auditor’s Office, she did not
substantially comply with the requirements for recording liens against real
property. See Kim v. Lee, 9 P.3d 245, 249 (Wash. App. Ct. 2000), rev’d on other
grounds, 31 P.3d 665 (Wash. 2001) (en banc) (“Washington courts have long
upheld actions taken in substantial compliance with statutory requirements, albeit
with procedural imperfections. Substantial compliance requires ‘actual compliance
in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of [the] statute.’”
(quoting City of Seattle v. Pub. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 809 P.2d 1377, 1380
(Wash. 1991) (en banc))).
The district court also did not abuse its discretion when it denied Ramsum’s
motion to vacate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Maraziti v. Thorpe, 52 F.3d 252, 253
(9th Cir. 1995) (“This Court reviews a denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for relief
from judgment under an abuse of discretion standard.”). Ramsum could have
made the legal argument set forth in her motion to vacate in response to JP Morgan
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Chase’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Allmerica Fin. Life Ins. & Annuity
Co. v. Llewellyn, 139 F.3d 664, 666 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that “[n]either
ignorance nor carelessness on the part of the litigant or his attorney provide
grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(1).” (internal citation omitted)). Regardless,
the statute Ramsum relied on in her Rule 60(b) motion—Wash. Rev. Code
§ 65.04.047—does not alter the outcome.
AFFIRMED.
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