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14-15960•Quinn Wilson v. Charles L. Ryan;
14-15960Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitMay 29, 2015
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
QUINN WILSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CHARLES L. RYAN; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 14-15960
D.C. No. 4:12-cv-00851-CKJ
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 13, 2015**
Before: LEAVY, CALLAHAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Quinn Wilson, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violation of his
right to freely exercise his religious beliefs under the First Amendment. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s
FILED
MAY 29 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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summary judgment and finding of qualified immunity, Tarabochia v. Adkins, 766
F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2014), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity because defendants’ conduct did not violate clearly established
law. See Estate of Ford v. Ramierz-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1049-50 (9th Cir.
2002) (a prison official may be entitled to qualified immunity where he has a
reasonable, but mistaken, belief about the facts or about what the law requires in a
given situation). Contrary to Wilson’s contentions, the law was not sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would understand he was required to provide a pre-
dawn meal, rather than a pre-sunrise meal, during Ramadan. See Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (to be clearly established, “[t]he contours of
the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
what he is doing violates that right”).
Wilson’s requests for counsel, set forth in his briefs, are denied.
AFFIRMED.
14-15960 2
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