Narviez V. Alexander v. James Keener;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NARVIEZ V. ALEXANDER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
JAMES KEENER; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 14-15660
D.C. No. 3:12-cv-00535-MMD-
VPC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Miranda Du, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 13, 2015**
Before: LEAVY, CALLAHAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Nevada state prisoner Narviez V. Alexander appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate
indifference to his safety and due process violations. We have jurisdiction under
FILED
MAY 27 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

-- 1 of 3 --

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab.,
726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Alexander’s
deliberate indifference claim, because Alexander failed to raise a genuine dispute
of material fact as to whether defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk
to his safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (“[A] prison
official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment . . . unless the official
knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate safety[.]”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Alexander’s due
process claim regarding his placement in administrative segregation, because
Alexander failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the
defendants provided him timely notice of the charges against him. See Hewitt v.
Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 476 & n.8 (1983) (due process requirements for placement in
administrative segregation), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Alexander’s due
process claim regarding his disciplinary hearing, because Alexander failed to raise
a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether some evidence supported the
disciplinary board’s findings or whether he was able to call witnesses and present
14-15660 2

-- 2 of 3 --

documentary evidence. See Superintendent, Massachusetts Corr. Inst., Walpole v.
Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985) (requirements of due process are satisfied if “some
evidence” supports the disciplinary decision); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
563-70 (1974) (setting forth due process requirements for prison disciplinary
proceedings).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Alexander’s state law claims. See Ove v. Gwinn,
264 F.3d 817, 821, 826 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and
explaining that “[a] court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
related state-law claims once it has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We reject Alexander’s contentions that the district court improperly weighed
the evidence, decided disputed facts in favor of the moving party, and erroneously
considered unsworn statements.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009)
(per curiam).
All pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.
14-15660 3

-- 3 of 3 --