United States of America v. Kenneth Lamar Spratt, a.k.a. Ken Sparks

13-50254Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitMay 19, 2015

Full text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KENNETH LAMAR SPRATT, a.k.a. Ken
Sparks,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 13-50254
D.C. No. 2:11-cr-00859-GAF-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Gary A. Feess, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 4, 2015 **
Pasadena, California
Before: PREGERSON, TALLMAN, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Kenneth Lamar Spratt pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine and
marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(B). We have
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
FILED
MAY 19 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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1. Spratt’s plea agreement contains a general waiver of his right to appeal
his conviction and sentence. This waiver covers the grounds for this appeal,
including Spratt’s appeal from the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea, United States v. Rahman, 642 F.3d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 2011), and
Spratt’s challenges to his sentence.
2. “The record shows that [Spratt] waived his appellate rights knowingly
and voluntarily,” United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 986 (9th Cir. 2009), and
we are satisfied that the district court complied with Rule 11 when it accepted
Spratt’s guilty plea, United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir.
2005), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 957
(9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). And although the district court and the government
made minor errors during the colloquy, those errors do not require reversal because
they did not affect Spratt’s substantial rights. See United States v. Ross, 511 F.3d
1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 2008).
3. Finally, we do not consider Spratt’s argument that his counsel was
ineffective because, “[a]s a general rule, we do not review challenges to the
effectiveness of defense counsel on direct appeal.” Rahman, 642 F.3d at 1259
(quoting Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1155) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
United States v. Brizan, 709 F.3d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 2013).
2

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DISMISSED.
3

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