United States of America v. Spiros Romensas

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SPIROS ROMENSAS,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 14-50153
D.C. No. 3:12-cr-01073-WQH-2
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
William Q. Hayes, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 7, 2015**
Pasadena, California
Before: BEA and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges and RICE,*** District Judge.
FILED
MAY 18 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Thomas O. Rice, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.

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Spiros Romensas appeals his conviction and sentence for aiding and abetting
bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2113(a). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and we affirm.
We review de novo the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver; the underlying
factual findings are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Jennings, 515 F.3d
980, 986 (9th Cir. 2008). A trial court’s finding that a Miranda waiver was
knowing and intelligent is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d
709, 728 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, police officers read to Romensas each of his
Miranda rights. Romensas told officers that he understood each right. He then
spoke to officers at length in English. The court “in all cases must examine the
totality of the circumstances,” and here the district court did not err in concluding
that Romensas’s waiver of his rights was voluntary. United States v. Amano, 229
F.3d 801, 805 (9th Cir. 2000). Further, Romensas waived each of his rights “with
a full awareness of both the right being abandoned and the consequences of the
decision to abandon it,” and his waiver was knowing and intelligent. Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
Romensas introduced his ex-wife’s testimony that Romensas had received a
large cash settlement following their divorce to prove that Romensas had no need
for the money his co-defendant Steve Ruby robbed from the banks. After her
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testimony, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the
government to cross-examine Romensas’s ex-wife about Romensas’s gambling
and employment history. Such cross-examination was permissible to “rebut any
false impression that might have resulted from the earlier admission” of evidence
as to Romensas’s lack of need of money from the bank robberies. See United
States v. Whitworth, 856 F.2d 1268, 1285 (9th Cir. 1988).
Whether a defendant is entitled to a sentencing guidelines reduction as a
minor participant is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Rodriguez-Castro,
641 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2011). Romensas denied any role in the robberies.
The evidence adduced at trial showed that Romensas was the getaway driver, and
as such, a necessary and fully active participant in the robberies. The district court
did not clearly err in refusing to apply a minor role reduction.
When a defendant fails to object to the application of a specific sentencing
guideline, its application is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Hammons,
558 F.3d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009). Romensas did not object to the application of
a three-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E) for Ruby’s brandishing
a dangerous weapon in the course of a robbery. The enhancement applies where
the brandishing is a reasonably foreseeable act in furtherance of the crime.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Romensas’s co-defendant brandished a weapon that
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was later recovered in Romensas’s truck. Brandishing of a weapon is a reasonably
foreseeable act in furtherance of the crime of robbery, and the district court did not
plainly err in applying the three-level enhancement.
AFFIRMED.
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