Darin Jones v. Corrections Corporation of America

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DARIN JONES,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF
AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 13-15177
D.C. No. 2:10-cv-02769-RCB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Robert C. Broomfield, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 22, 2015**
Before: GOODWIN, BYBEE, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Alaska state prisoner Darin Jones appeals pro se from the district court’s
summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various constitutional
violations by Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”). We have jurisdiction
FILED
APR 28 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

-- 1 of 3 --

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051,
1056 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Jones’s failure to
protect claims because, even assuming that a constitutional deprivation occurred,
Jones failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any
constitutional deprivation resulted from an official policy, practice, or custom of
CCA. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978) (explaining
that an entity acting under color of state law may be sued only where the action
that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that
body’s officers, or if the deprivations are pursuant to governmental custom); see
also Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e see
no basis in the reasoning underlying Monell to distinguish between municipalities
and private entities acting under color of state law.”).
We do not consider Jones’s argument regarding amendment of his complaint
because he raised this argument for the first time on appeal. See Greger v.
Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a new issue raised on
appeal was waived by counseled plaintiff’s failure to raise it before the district
court).
13-15177 2

-- 2 of 3 --

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009)
(per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
13-15177 3

-- 3 of 3 --