In re: JERRY GREENWOOD and EUGENIA GREENWOOD v. ANGELIQUE L.MCLARK, Trustee and ONEWEST BANK

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: JERRY GREENWOOD and
EUGENIA GREENWOOD,
Debtors,
JERRY GREENWOOD and EUGENIA
GREENWOOD,
Appellants,
v.
ANGELIQUE L.M CLARK, Trustee and
ONEWEST BANK,
Appellees.
No. 12-60063
BAP No. 12-1204
MEMORANDUM*
In re: JERRY GREENWOOD and
EUGENIA GREENWOOD,
Debtors,
JERRY GREENWOOD and EUGENIA
GREENWOOD,
Appellants,
No. 12-60064
BAP No. 12-1244
FILED
FEB 13 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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v.
ANGELIQUE L.M CLARK, Trustee and
ONEWEST BANK,
Appellees.
Appeals from the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Kirscher, Hollowell, and Dunn, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding
Submitted February 10, 2015**
San Francisco California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and TASHIMA and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
Jerry and Eugenia Greenwood appeal from the Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel’s order dismissing their appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Nevada for lack of standing. We affirm. Because the parties are
familiar with the history of the case, we need not recount it here. We review the
issue of whether appellants have standing de novo. Natural Res. Def. Council v.
EPA, 542 F.3d 1235, 1244 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Wiersma v. Bank of the West
(In re Wiersma), 483 F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 2007). “Only persons who are
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by an order have standing to appeal the
order.” Paine v. Dickey (In re Paine), 250 B.R. 99, 104 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000).
The Greenwoods, Chapter 7 debtors, failed to establish an interest from
which they could benefit in pursuing their appeal. Their claimed homestead
exemption falls under 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(1)’s prohibition on exemption of
voluntarily transferred property. See Glass v. Hitt (In re Glass), 60 F.3d 565, 569
(9th Cir. 1995) (trustee’s mere threat of seeking avoidance sufficed to meet the
threshold level of action necessary to trigger § 522(g)); Hunter v. Snyder (In re
Snyder), 108 B.R. 150, 153 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989) (settlement of an adversary
proceeding suffices to invoke § 522(g)).
In order to show that their homestead exemption might be preserved under §
522(g)(1) as against the lienholder, the Greenwoods were required to demonstrate
that their grant of a security interest in excess of the property’s value was not
voluntary. 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(1); see also Rodriguez v. Dorine’s Bail Bonds, Inc.
(In re Rodriguez), 361 B.R. 887, 892 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2007). There is no evidence
in the record indicating that the transfer of the deed of trust encumbering the home
was involuntary, and the Greenwoods offer none. As a result, the transfer is
ineligible for exemption under § 522(g)(1), and the Greenwoods lack a personal
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stake in the challenged settlement order and related orders sufficient to establish
standing.
The motion to dismiss is denied as moot.
AFFIRMED.
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