Loring Winn Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire District

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LORING WINN WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CHINO VALLEY INDEPENDENT FIRE
DISTRICT,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 12-57135
D.C. No. 2:12-cv-05935-R-DTB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 9, 2015 **
Pasadena California
Before: KOZINSKI, CHRISTEN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
The district court dismissed, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, the complaint filed by Loring Williams alleging violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, and the California Fair
FILED
FEB 12 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12900-12996, by his former
employer, Chino Valley Independent Fire District. We have jurisdiction over
Williams’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.
1. Williams did not state a disparate-treatment claim under California or federal
law. The one-year limit on eligibility for requalification in Chino Valley’s Personnel
Rules applies to all retirees, regardless of whether they are disabled, and thus is not
facially discriminatory. If the one-year bar prevented Williams from seeking open
positions, this was the result of his decision to pursue requalification rather than
undergo the ordinary competitive process, and not “because of” his disability. See
Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999); Wills v. Super.
Ct., 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 15 (Ct. App. 2011).
2. Williams also failed to state a disparate-impact claim. Williams does not
allege any group-based hiring disparity, see Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
U.S. 977, 986-87 (1988); Stockwell v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 749 F.3d 1107,
1115 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2014), nor does he identify a specific policy or practice that had
a disparate impact on disability retirees, see Stout v. Potter, 276 F.3d 1118, 1121 (9th
Cir. 2002).
3. Williams claims that he was denied a reasonable accommodation in the form
of an extension of the one-year eligibility limit. But an extension of the eligibility
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limit is “not a modification or adjustment to the workplace necessary to enable him
to perform the essential functions of his position.” Scotch v. Art Inst. of Cal.-Orange
Cnty., Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 338, 360 (Ct. App. 2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
4. The failure to offer a reasonable accommodation is a prerequisite for an
interactive-process claim, see Watkins v. Ameripride Servs., 375 F.3d 821, 829 n.5
(9th Cir. 2004) (citing Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 487, 496 (Ct.
App. 1999)), and the interactive-process claim therefore also fails.
5. Because Williams offered no new facts and no other basis for amending the
complaint, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend.
See Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 2008); Thinket Ink
Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsys., Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004).
AFFIRMED.
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