Ronald Everett v. BRAZELTON, Warden

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RONALD EVERETT,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
BRAZELTON, Warden,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 13-17035
D.C. No. 1:12-cv-00680-BAM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Barbara McAuliffe, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted December 9, 2014***
Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Ronald Everett appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging constitutional violations in
connection with loss of property and disciplinary proceedings. We have
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** Everett consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
*** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
FILED
DEC 18 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2 13-17035
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Wilhelm v. Rotman,
680 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren
v. Harrington, 152 F .3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The district court properly dismissed Everett’s due process claim based on
his loss of property because Everett had an adequate post-deprivation remedy
under California law. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (no due
process claim against a state employee for an unauthorized intentional or negligent
deprivation of property where state law provides an adequate post-deprivation
remedy); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam)
(“California [l]aw provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any property
deprivations.”). The court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend
as to this claim because amendment would have been futile. See Hartmann v.
Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) (setting forth
the standard of review and explaining that “[a] district court may deny leave to
amend when amendment would be futile”).
The district court also dismissed as Heck-barred Everett’s claims challenging
his disciplinary proceedings because Everett alleged a loss of time credits. See

-- 2 of 3 --

3 13-17035
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (precluding § 1983 claims which,
if successful, “would necessarily imply the invalidity” of an inmate’s conviction or
sentence). However, a document attached to Everett’s complaint and judicially
noticeable court records show that the disciplinary proceedings did not result in a
loss of time credits or otherwise impact the length of Everett’s sentence. See
Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751 (2004) (per curiam) (“Heck’s requirement
to resort to state litigation and federal habeas before § 1983 is not . . . implicated
by a prisoner’s challenge that threatens no consequence for his conviction or the
duration of his sentence.”). Thus, Everett’s claims are not Heck-barred, and we
reverse and remand for the district court to consider in the first instance the merits
of these claims and provide Everett notice of any defects and an opportunity to
amend with the benefit of that notice.
We reject Everett’s contentions concerning the district court’s prior grant of
leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the alleged need for review of the
magistrate judge’s decision.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

-- 3 of 3 --