Darryl Kent Wakefield v. Richard Indermill; Cspc/cdcr

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DARRYL KENT WAKEFIELD,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
RICHARD INDERMILL; CSPC/CDCR,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 12-15062
D.C. No. 1:09-cv-00274-LJO-
BAM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 9, 2014**
Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Darryl Kent Wakefield, a former California state prisoner, appeals pro se
from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
violations of his right to free exercise under the First Amendment and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). We have
FILED
DEC 18 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Shakur v. Schriro, 514
F.3d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 2008), and may affirm on any ground supported by the
record, Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir.
2008). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Wakefield’s First
Amendment claim because Wakefield failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether the denial of weekly religious services was not rationally related
to a legitimate penological interest in maintaining prison security. See O’Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350-53 (1987) (restraint on inmate’s ability to
exercise his religion does not violate the First Amendment if it is reasonably
related to a legitimate penological interest).
Summary judgment on Wakefield’s RLUIPA claim was proper because
Wakefield failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether denying
him weekly communion and foot washing services in the Security Housing Unit
was not the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest,
in light of defendant’s evidence that less restrictive measures were actually
considered and rejected. See Greene v. Solano Cnty. Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 986-90
(9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth RLUIPA standard); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544
U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005) (“[P]rison security is a compelling state interest, and . . .
12-15062 2

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deference is due to institutional officials’ expertise in this area.”).
AFFIRMED.
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