Billy Ray Phiffer, an individual v. State of Oregon, as being represented by Baker County Circuit Court

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BILLY RAY PHIFFER, an individual,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
STATE OF OREGON, as being
represented by Baker County Circuit Court
and the Office of District Attorney for
Baker County, a public entity; BAKER
COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE; BAKER COUNTY CIRCUIT
COURT,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 12-35550
D.C. No. 2:10-CV-01120-SU
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Anna J. Brown, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 6, 2014**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and D.W. NELSON and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
FILED
DEC 05 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Billy Ray Phiffer appeals the district court’s judgment in favor of the State
of Oregon. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
The district court did not err in dismissing Phiffer’s claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. “The Eleventh Amendment has been authoritatively construed to deprive
federal courts of jurisdiction over suits by private parties against unconsenting
States.” Seven Up Pete Venture v. Schweitzer, 523 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 2008)
(citing Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996)). The Supreme Court
has held that Congress did not abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity
in enacting § 1983. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 n.17 (1985) (citing
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979)). Moreover, the State of Oregon has not
expressly waived its immunity.
The district court did not err in dismissing Phiffer’s claims under the
American with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court
properly found the underlying actors allegedly involved in scheduling the hearing
forming the basis of Phiffer’s claims—the state court judge, court clerk, and
district attorney—were protected by judicial, quasi-judicial, and prosecutorial
immunities respectively. See In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 951 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that “the scheduling of hearings” by a non-judicial officer was an action
entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity); Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d
2

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1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Ruling on a motion is a normal judicial
function . . . .”). As the State of Oregon can only be liable here for the actions of
the Baker County Circuit Court and the Baker County District Attorney based on
the doctrine of respondeat superior, these immunities also protect the State as all of
the underlying actors are immune from liability. See Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Apportionment Liab. § 13 cmt. b (2000) (“The vicariously liable party is liable
only for the share of plaintiff’s damages for which the tortious actor is held
liable.”)
AFFIRMED.
3

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