Paul William Pilger v. U.s. Department of Education;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PAUL WILLIAM PILGER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION;
et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 12-17361
D.C. No. 2:11-cv-00159-GMN-
PAL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Gloria M. Navarro, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 22, 2014**
Before: GOODWIN, CANBY, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Paul William Pilger appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his action challenging the Department of Education’s denial of his
request to discharge his federally-guaranteed student loans. We have jurisdiction
FILED
AUG 4 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter
Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2013). We may affirm on
any ground supported by the record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP,
534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment to the Department of
Education because Pilger failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether the Department’s decision to deny his request for a discharge was arbitrary
or capricious. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulations are “controlling unless plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted));
Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 680 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 2012) (setting
forth the arbitrary and capricious standard of review and explaining the limited
circumstances in which the court will vacate an agency’s decision).
Dismissal of Pilger’s claims against Affiliated Computer Services was
proper because Pilger cannot assert a cause of action against Affiliated Computer
Services under the Higher Education Act. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v.
Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484-85 (9th Cir. 1995) (the Higher Education Act
provides an express right of action only in suits brought against the Secretary of
Education).
12-17361 2

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We do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. See Smith v.
Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).
AFFIRMED.
12-17361 3

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