United States of America v. LESTER THOMAS EALY, Sr., a.k.a. Lester Thomas Ealy

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LESTER THOMAS EALY, Sr., a.k.a.
Lester Thomas Ealy,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 09-30326
D.C. No. 2:08-cr-06086-RHW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Robert H. Whaley, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 25, 2014**
Before: HAWKINS, TALLMAN, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Lester Thomas Ealy, Sr., appeals from the district court’s judgment imposed
following his guilty-plea conviction for failing to register as a sex offender under
FILED
JUN 27 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2250(a). Ealy challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to
dismiss the indictment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
do novo, see United States v. Cabrera-Gutierrez, No. 12-30233, 2014 WL 998173,
at *2 (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 2014), and we affirm.
Ealy contends that the district court should have dismissed the indictment
because SORNA did not require him to register in Washington until Washington
had implemented a SORNA-compliant registry. He argues that a contrary
interpretation of SORNA raises constitutional concerns under the Commerce and
Ex Post Facto Clauses. Ealy’s argument is foreclosed by recent cases of this court.
See id. at *3-4 (Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to enact
SORNA); United States v. Elk Shoulder, 738 F.3d 948, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2013),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1920 (2014) (rejecting ex post facto challenge to SORNA);
United States v. Elkins, 683 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he federal
government’s prosecution of an alleged violation of SORNA is not dependent on
the individual state’s implementation of the administrative portion of SORNA.”).
Ealy next argues that even if SORNA required him to register, it only
required him to comply with Washington law. He further contends that, because
Washington law did not require him to register, he would not have been permitted
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to do so and thus, compliance with SORNA was impossible. This argument fails
because Ealy could have complied with SORNA by registering with the State of
Washington. See Elk Shoulder, 738 F.3d at 955 (“Because Elk Shoulder could
have registered with the State of Montana’s registry, and because this would have
allowed him to register ‘as required by’ SORNA, it was not impossible for Elk
Shoulder to meet the requirements of § 2250(a).”). Moreover, the record supports
the district court’s finding that Ealy would have been permitted to register had he
attempted to do so, and thus, he could have complied with SORNA.
AFFIRMED.
09-30326 3

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