Deandra Grant, an individual v. National College for Dui Defense, a Washington corporation

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DEANDRA GRANT, an individual,
Plaintiff,
and
OKORIE OKOROCHA, Esquire,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
NATIONAL COLLEGE FOR DUI
DEFENSE, a Washington corporation,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 12-56622
D.C. No. 2:12-cv-03255-GW-
AGR
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 12, 2014**
Before: McKEOWN, WARDLAW, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
FILED
JUN 18 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Okorocha’s
request for oral argument, set forth in his opening brief, is denied.

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Okorie Okorocha, an attorney representing plaintiff Deandra Grant, appeals
pro se from the district court’s order imposing sanctions on Okorocha under Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion, Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,
496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990), and we affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by sanctioning Okorocha under
Rule 11 because the record supports the conclusion that Okorocha was not a proper
plaintiff in his client’s action and filed the amended pleading for the improper
purpose of maintaining venue in the district court. See Sneller v. City of
Bainbridge Island, 606 F.3d 636, 638-39 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Rule 11 authorizes a
court to impose a sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that brings a claim
for an improper purpose or without support in law or evidence.”); Hudson v.
Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 836 F.2d 1156, 1163 (9th Cir. 1987) (district court is
entitled to broad discretion in setting the amount of a fee award).
We reject Okorocha’s contention that the district court abused its discretion
by awarding fees to defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4) (sanction may include
“an order directing payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable
attorney’s fees and other expenses directly resulting from the violation”).
AFFIRMED.
12-56622 2

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