Juan De La Torre-Flores; Servando De La Torre v. JANET A. NAPOLITANO, Secretary Department of Homeland Security

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JUAN DE LA TORRE-FLORES;
SERVANDO DE LA TORRE,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
JANET A. NAPOLITANO, Secretary
Department of Homeland Security;
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON,
Secretary of the U.S. Department of State;
YOLANDA MIRANDA, Field Office
Director, Ciudad Juarez Field Office,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 12-56548
D.C. No. 3:11-cv-02698-IEG-
WVG
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Irma E. Gonzalez, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 7, 2014 **
Pasadena, California
Before: THOMAS, M. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
FILED
APR 09 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Juan De La Torre-Flores (“De La Torre-Flores”) and Servando De La Torre
appeal from the district court’s order dismissing their action with prejudice for
both lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. Because the parties are
familiar with the history of the case, we will not recount it here. We review de
novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps.,
AFL-CIO Local 2152 v. Principi, 464 F.3d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006).
The district court properly dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The four bases upon which De La Torre-Flores asserted subject
matter jurisdiction fail, as he concedes on appeal. First, “[t]he Declaratory
Judgment Act does not provide an independent jurisdictional basis for suits in
federal court.” Fiedler v. Clark, 714 F.2d 77, 79 (9th Cir. 1983). Second, because
De La Torre-Flores did not allege that an agency failed to act upon a
nondiscretionary duty, jurisdiction also fails under the Administrative Procedure
Act, Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004), and under
mandamus, Patel v. Reno, 134 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 1998). Third, as to whether
De La Torre-Flores’s 1998 expedited removal was erroneous, the district court
lacks jurisdiction “to review . . . any individual determination or to entertain any
other cause or claim arising from or relating to the implementation or operation of
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an order of removal pursuant to section 1225(b)(1).” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A).
Finally, jurisdiction over any constitutional challenge to the expedited removal
regime is specifically limited to actions “instituted in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A). Accordingly, the
district court properly dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Given the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we need not reach any other
issue urged by the parties.
AFFIRMED.
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