Sanford D. Jones v. LEE D. BACA, Sheriff of Los Angeles County; COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a public entity

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SANFORD D. JONES,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
LEE D. BACA, Sheriff of Los Angeles
County; COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, a
public entity,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-56503
D.C. No. 2:07-cv-08194-PA
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 18, 2014**
Before: ALARCÓN, O’SCANNLAIN, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
Sanford D. Jones appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations during his
detention in the Los Angeles County Jail pursuant to California’s Sexually Violent
FILED
MAR 03 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Predator Act (“SVP Act”). We review de novo, Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918,
926 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because, even
assuming that a constitutional deprivation occurred, Jones failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether any such constitutional deprivation resulted
from an official county custom or policy, whether Baca was personally involved in
any constitutional violation, or whether there was a causal connection between
Baca’s conduct and any such violation. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978) (requirements for municipal liability); Starr v. Baca, 652
F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (requirements for supervisory liability); see also
Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989) (party opposing summary
judgment must present “significant probative evidence tending to support its claim
that material, triable issues of fact remain” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
We reject Jones’s contention that his detention in a jail pursuant to the SVP
Act is unconstitutional. See Jones, 393 F.3d at 932 (declining to hold that
involuntary civil commitment detainees cannot be housed in jail).
We also reject Jones’s contention that he raised a genuine dispute of material
fact based on the “totality of conditions” of his confinement. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682
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F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472 (1995) (courts generally may not find constitutional violations based
on the totality of conditions of confinement).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
11-56503 3

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