United States of America v. ROBBIONTA MONSON, AKA Fred, AKA Lil Rob

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROBBIONTA MONSON, AKA Fred,
AKA Lil Rob,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 12-50180
D.C. No. 2:10-cr-00923-SJO-13
MEMORANDUM*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STEVEN RENELL WILLIAMS, Jr., AKA
Baby Ben, AKA Brazie, AKA Brazy,
AKA Little Stevie, AKA Steven Williams,
AKA Steven Renil Williams,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 12-50537
D.C. No. 2:10-cr-00923-SJO-10
FILED
FEB 07 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 3, 2014 **
Pasadena, California
Before: KLEINFELD, SILVERMAN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Robbionta Monson appeals the sentence imposed after his guilty plea to
conspiracy to commit racketeering offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) and
conspiracy to commit drug trafficking in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and
841(b)(1)(A). Steven Williams appeals his criminal sentence imposed after his
guilty plea to discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
Monson’s argument that the district court erroneously imposed a two-level
firearm enhancement fails because the district court did no such thing. It did not
calculate a U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b) enhancement. It merely considered Monson’s
conduct as a sentencing factor under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Monson’s claim that the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 32(h) by failing to give notice of its intent to depart above the guideline
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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range fails because the district court did not engage in a “departure.” Rather, it
“varied” above the guideline. No notice is required for a variance. See Irizarry v.
United States, 553 U.S. 708, 714 (2008); United States v. Christensen, 732 F.3d
1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 2013).
Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by sentencing Monson above
the guidelines range to 211-month concurrent sentences in light of Monson’s very
bad prior record, his role in this violent case, and his danger to the community, all
of which the district court fully explained.
Williams argues that the government breached its agreement to recommend
the statutory minimum sentence by emphasizing aggravating facts at sentencing,
even though it reiterated its agreed-to recommendation. The government breaches
an agreement to make no sentencing recommendation or to recommend a sentence
at the low end of the guidelines range by arguing or presenting fact that serve no
purpose at sentencing other than to urge the court to sentence the defendant above
the agreed-upon sentence. United States v. Whitney, 673 F.3d 965, 971 (9th Cir.
2012); United States v. Mondragon, 228 F.3d 978, 980-81 (9th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Johnson, 187 F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 1999). But, the government does
not breach its agreement if it complies with its duty to correct factual inaccuracies
or to provide new relevant factual information to the court. Id.; United States v.
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Maldonado, 215 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Read, 778 F.2d
1437, 1442 (9th Cir. 1985).
In this case, the government did not argue or introduce facts that served no
purpose other than to urge a higher sentence. There was no agreement regarding
supervised release, and the government argued that the facts it supplied supported
the agreed-upon sentence and its request for the maximum supervised release term,
and special release conditions.
Moreover, the parties agreed that each side retained the right to supplement
the plea agreement’s stipulated facts. In addition, the government was duty-bound
to provide the full facts to the court. Read, 778 F.2d at 1441-42. Because the facts
argued by the government were relevant to the requested supervised release term
and conditions, which were not part of the stipulated sentence, and the government
provided new relevant information that was not in the presentence report or plea
agreement, the government did not implicitly breach its agreement to recommend
the statutory minimum sentence.
William’s brief also raises other claims of breach of the plea agreement that
were not objected to in the district court. These claims do not survive plain error
review.
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Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Williams
to 156 months in prison. The maximum sentence was life; the ten-year mandatory
minimum was the guideline sentence. Williams admitted that he was involved in a
gang conspiracy to possess weapons in furtherance of the drug conspiracy,
encouraged others to violently protect gang territory just prior to the September 11
shooting, sold at least one weapon, ordered ammunition, sold drugs, had a problem
managing aggressive behavior and anger, had a violent history, and agreed that it
was reasonably foreseeable that two co-conspirators intended to possess firearms
and to shoot into the victims’ residence on September 11. The court also
considered the mitigating evidence, including a “horrific” childhood, and indicated
that it was imposing a sentence lower than originally contemplated because of the
mitigating facts. Under the totality of the circumstances considered by the court,
the district court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Williams to 156 months
of incarceration, three years longer than the mandatory minimum but still much
less than the maximum possible sentence of life.
AFFIRMED.
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