United States of America v. Alexander Gallegos

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALEXANDER GALLEGOS,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 13-10017
D.C. No. 2:11-cr-00455-GMN-
CWH-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Gloria M. Navarro, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 23, 2013**
Before: HUG, FARRIS, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
Alexander Gallegos appeals from the district court’s judgment and
challenges the district court’s denial of his third request for a continuance. We
review the district court’s denial of the continuance for abuse of discretion. United
FILED
FEB 06 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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States v. Wills, 88 F.3d 704, 711 (9th Cir. 1996). We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Gallegos contends that the district court erred when it denied him a
continuance during his sentencing hearing because a continuance would have
allowed him to obtain an expert opinion that might have addressed the issue of
causation between his brain injury and his criminal conduct and might have
provided a treatment plan to address the court’s concern regarding his danger to the
community. The district court did not abuse its discretion. Gallegos has not
shown that the denial of the continuance prejudiced him. See Wills, 88 F.3d at 711;
United States v. Gonzalez–Rincon, 36 F.3d 859, 865 (9th Cir. 1994). Gallegos also
has not identified an expert witness and set forth the substance of the expert
testimony that would have been proffered if more time had been afforded to him.
See Gonzalez–Rincon, 36 F.3d at 865 (holding that district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying a continuance where the appellant did not establish the
substance of any expert testimony she could have obtained if granted the
continuance); see also United States v. Smith, 790 F.2d 789, 796 (9th Cir. 1986).
AFFIRMED.
2

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