CHICO SCRAP METAL, INC., a California corporation v. Leonard E. Robinson

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHICO SCRAP METAL, INC., a
California corporation; and GEORGE
SCOTT, SR., individually and as Trustee
of the George W. Scott, Sr. Revocable
Trust Inter Vivos Trust dated September
25, 1995,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
LEONARD E. ROBINSON, in his official
capacity as Acting Director of the
California Department of Toxic
Substances Control; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-17912
D.C. No. 2:11-cv-01201-JAM-
CMK
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 15, 2014 **
San Francisco, California
FILED
JAN 17 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Before: GRABER and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and DEARIE,*** Senior District
Judge.
Plaintiffs Chico Scrap Metal, Inc., and George W. Scott, Sr., filed this action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several defendants associated with the California
Department of Toxic Substances Control and the District Attorney of Butte
County. Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the enforcement of certain regulatory orders
relating to the clean up of hazardous wastes at Plaintiffs’ scrap metal recycling
facilities, plus a declaration that those cleanup orders are invalid, and they seek
monetary damages against the individual defendants. The district court dismissed
the action with prejudice on the ground that it is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477 (1994). Plaintiffs timely appeal. We affirm the dismissal but remand for
entry of a judgment of dismissal without prejudice.
Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims are barred by Heck because a judgment in their
favor, holding that the cleanup orders were imposed improperly and that the
prosecution was unlawful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of Plaintiffs’
state court convictions. See Szajer v. City of Los Angeles, 632 F.3d 607, 612 (9th
Cir. 2011) (holding that Heck barred a § 1983 challenge where a decision that the
undercover operation, which produced the only evidence for finding probable
*** The Honorable Raymond J. Dearie, Senior United States District Judge
for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
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cause, was unlawful would necessarily imply the invalidity of the convictions
resulting from the undercover operation); Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952
(9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (applying Heck to a § 1983 claim for unlawful
prosecution in the context of a plea bargain). The regulatory cleanup orders and
the criminal convictions both pertain to the same incidents in 2007.
In addition, Heck bars the claims because Plaintiffs were sentenced to
compliance with the challenged cleanup orders as a condition of their probation in
the criminal case, as specifically directed by the state court in its criminal
judgment. Thus, a decision in Plaintiffs’ favor in this civil action, holding that they
need not comply with the cleanup orders, would necessarily invalidate the criminal
sentence. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87 (holding that a claim invalidating the
court’s judgment in a criminal case is barred). Indeed, many of Plaintiffs’ disputes
are the subject of state court litigation seeking to revoke their probation in the
criminal case, further demonstrating the Heck bar.
The district court erred, though, in dismissing the action with prejudice. We
held in Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995) (per
curiam), that Heck-barred § 1983 claims must be dismissed without prejudice so
that the plaintiff may "reassert his claims if he ever succeeds in invalidating his
conviction."
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AFFIRMED; REMANDED for entry of a judgment of dismissal without
prejudice.
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