United States of America v. VERONICA ANA MARIA RAMIREZ, AKA Veronica Martinez, AKA Veronica Ana Ramirez, AKA…

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
VERONICA ANA MARIA RAMIREZ,
AKA Veronica Martinez, AKA Veronica
Ana Ramirez, AKA Veronica Maria
Ramirez,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 11-50521
D.C. No. 8:10-cr-00034-DOC-2
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 2, 2013
Pasadena, California
Before: SCHROEDER, CLIFTON, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
1. The district court did not plainly err in imposing the standard third-party
notification condition of supervised release. The Sentencing Guidelines include
the challenged third-party notification condition as a “standard” condition in
FILED
DEC 13 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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§ 5D1.3(c), rather than in the sections dealing with “special” occupational
restrictions. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 5D1.3(e), 5F1.5 (2011).
No Ninth Circuit precedent holds that imposition of the challenged condition
amounts to an occupational restriction. Ramirez relies on United States v. Britt,
332 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003), but that case dealt with a special condition
that directly and “expressly limit[ed] the terms” of the defendant’s employment at
the time it was imposed. In addition, other circuits addressing the challenge raised
by Ramirez appear to have split. Compare United States v. Souser, 405 F.3d 1162,
1165 (10th Cir. 2005), with United States v. Ritter, 118 F.3d 502, 504 n.2 (6th Cir.
1997). Under these circumstances, any error could not have been plain or obvious.
See United States v. Thompson, 82 F.3d 849, 855–56 (9th Cir. 1996).
2. The parties agree that, pursuant to the terms of Ramirez’s plea agreement,
the district court should have dismissed count 1. We remand for that limited
purpose.
AFFIRMED in part and REMANDED in part for the limited purpose of
dismissing count 1.

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