Shawn Lawrence Desautel v. Tetra Tech Ec, Inc.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHAWN LAWRENCE DESAUTEL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
TETRA TECH EC, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 12-35136
D.C. No. 2:11-cv-00187-EFS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Edward F. Shea, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 19, 2013**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Shawn Lawrence DesAutel appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his employment action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006).
FILED
DEC 11 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed DesAutel’s action because his claims
were barred by the separation agreement that he voluntarily entered into with his
former employer, Tetra Tech EC, Inc. See Stroman v. W. Coast Grocery Co., 884
F.2d 458, 461-63 (9th Cir. 1989) (a settlement agreement may waive Title VII
claims if the waiver is voluntary, deliberate, and informed); Nationwide Mut. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Watson, 840 P.2d 851, 856 (Wash. 1992) (discussing enforceability of
releases under Washington law).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying DesAutel’s motion
to strike Tetra’s motion to dismiss because DesAutel failed to show any reason to
strike the motion. See El Pollo Loco, Inc. v. Hashim, 316 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th
Cir. 2003) (providing standard of review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying DesAutel’s motion
for sanctions because DesAutel failed to comply with the mandatory twenty-one
day notice requirement. See Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co., 254 F.3d 772, 788-
89 (9th Cir. 2001) (providing standard of review and concluding that party was not
entitled to Rule 11 sanctions because it failed to serve its Rule 11 motion on the
opposing party twenty-days before filing the motion with the court).
DesAutel’s contention that the district court was biased is not supported by
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the record.
Because DesAutel does not raise the district court’s denial of his motions for
entry of default and default judgment in his opening brief, the issues are waived.
See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“This
court will not ordinarily consider matters on appeal that are not specifically and
distinctly raised and argued in appellant’s opening brief.” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
AFFIRMED.
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