Stirling Mortimer Global Property Fund Pcc Limited v. Richard Neill Trevor Roberts, a British citizen;

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STIRLING MORTIMER GLOBAL
PROPERTY FUND PCC LIMITED,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RICHARD NEILL TREVOR ROBERTS,
a British citizen; et al.,
Defendants - Appellants.
No. 13-15943
D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00301-GMN-
NJK
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Gloria M. Navarro, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 5, 2013
San Francisco, California
Before: TASHIMA, W. FLETCHER, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Richard Roberts, Jane Roberts, and Regal Property Holdings, Inc.
(“Appellants”) appeal the district court’s entry of a preliminary injunction (“PI”)
freezing certain assets and limiting their monthly expenses. We find no abuse of
FILED
NOV 18 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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discretion and therefore affirm. Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1076, 1078-79
(9th Cir. 2009).
Appellants contend the district court lacked authority to grant the PI because
Stirling Mortimer Global Property Fund PCC Ltd. (“Stirling Mortimer”) does not
assert any equitable interest in, or claim to, the targeted property. Not so. Stirling
Mortimer’s operative complaint asserts a claim for imposition of a constructive
trust, which we have held to support injunctive relief. Thomas v. Rubin (In re
Focus Media, Inc.), 387 F.3d 1077, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 2004). Appellants’ reliance,
in this regard, on Grupo Mexicano de Desarollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.,
527 U.S. 308 (1999), is misplaced. As we have previously observed, Grupo
Mexicano concerned legal damages only, and does not prohibit issuance of
injunctive relief where, as here, plaintiff has pled claims for relief that are equitable
in nature. In re Focus Media, 387 F.3d at 1085.
Appellants alternatively argue that the PI was wrongly issued because
Stirling Mortimer may move to stay proceedings, pending resolution of related
litigation in the United Kingdom. But Appellants have neglected to identify an
appropriate legal framework through which to assess this argument, or any
authority supporting the substance of their position that a motion to stay
undermines an earlier request for injunctive relief.
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Further, we reject Appellants’ various challenges to the sufficiency of the
evidentiary record. Appellants maintain the district court placed too much weight
on Stirling Mortimer’s verified complaint, which included some hearsay. The
district court was permitted to consider the verified allegations as well as hearsay,
Johnson, 572 F.3d at 1083, and here its reliance on those materials was justified
because appellants (1) chose not to examine the witness who verified Stirling
Mortimer’s allegations, and (2) did not “substantially controvert” the averments
and instead merely issued a blanket denial of any wrongdoing. See, e.g., K-2 Ski
Co. v. Head Ski Co., 467 F.2d 1087, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1972). Appellants’ other
attacks on the district court’s inquiry into the factual record likewise fail: the court
did not clearly err in tracing specific assets to the alleged fraud, or limiting
Appellants’ monthly expenses.
Finally, we need not address Appellants’ arguments concerning their later
bankruptcy filing because those arguments were not raised below and do not
appear meritorious in any case. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120-21 (1976).
AFFIRMED.
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