Regina Lynn Villone v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision***
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
REGINA LYNN VILLONE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 11-17418
D.C. No. 3:09-cv-08213-LOA
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Lawrence O. Anderson, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted September 24, 2013***
Before: RAWLINSON, N.R. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Regina Lynn Villone appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in her employment action against United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”)
FILED
OCT 04 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo, Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir.
2003), and we affirm.
The district court properly determined that Villone’s disability
discrimination claim arising out of UPS’s alleged acts in 2006 is time-barred
because Villone filed her lawsuit more than ninety days after the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) June 26, 2007 right to sue
letter. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (ADA incorporates Title VII procedures); Edwards
v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 892 F.2d 1442, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990) (“An action
brought under Title VII must be filed within ninety days of receipt of a right to sue
letter from the EEOC or appropriate state agency.”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Villone’s
remaining disability discrimination claim because Villone failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether she was “disabled” within the meaning of the
ADA. See Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1231 (discussing definition of “disability” under
the ADA, including being “regarded as” having a disability); see also Walton v.
U.S. Marshals Serv., 492 F.3d 998, 1006 (9th Cir. 2007) (to show that she is
“regarded as” having a disability, “a plaintiff must show that her employer regards

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her as substantially limited in a major life activity and not just unable to meet a
particular job performance standard”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Villone’s
retaliation claim because Villone failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether UPS took an adverse employment action against her or whether there
was a causal connection between her protected activity and the alleged adverse
actions. See Pardi v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 389 F.3d 840, 849-50 (9th Cir. 2004)
(discussing prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.

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