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11-35363•Wendell W. Reinking v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.
11-35363Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitAug 29, 2013
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WENDELL W. REINKING,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALYESKA PIPELINE SERVICE CO.;
ALYESKA PIPELINE SERVICE CO.
PENSION FOR OPERATING
COMPANY EMPLOYEES, initially
effective July 1, 1976; ALYESKA
PIPELINE SERVICE CO.
SEPARATION BENEFITS PLAN NO.
516; ALYESKA PIPELINE SERVICE
CO. PENSION PLAN RETIREMENT
AND TRUST COMMITTEE;
ALYESKA PIPELINE SERVICE CO.
HUMAN RESOURCES
DEPARTMENT AS PLAN
ADMINISTRATOR FOR ALYESKA
SEPARATION BENEFITS PLAN NO.
516,
Defendants - Appellants.
No. 11-35363
D.C. No. 3:07-cv-00212-JWS
MEMORANDUM*
WENDELL W. REINKING, No. 11-35397
FILED
AUG 29 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
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page 2
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ALYESKA PIPELINE SERVICE CO.;
ALYESKA PIPELINE SERVICE CO.
PENSION FOR OPERATING
COMPANY EMPLOYEES, initially
effective July 1, 1976; ALYESKA
PIPELINE SERVICE CO.
SEPARATION BENEFITS PLAN NO.
516; ALYESKA PIPELINE SERVICE
CO. PENSION PLAN RETIREMENT
AND TRUST COMMITTEE;
ALYESKA PIPELINE SERVICE CO.
HUMAN RESOURCES
DEPARTMENT AS PLAN
ADMINISTRATOR FOR ALYESKA
SEPARATION BENEFITS PLAN NO.
516,
Defendants - Appellees.
D.C. No. 3:07-cv-00212-JWS
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
John W. Sedwick, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 14, 2013
Anchorage, Alaska
Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, BERZON and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
1. The structural conflict of interest present in this case is entitled to little
weight because there’s no evidence of malice, self-dealing, a suspect claims-
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page 3
granting history, inadequate investigation of a claim or failure to credit a
claimant’s reliable evidence. See Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d
955, 968–69 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
2. The Pension Plan administrator didn’t abuse its discretion in denying
Reinking’s application for benefits. See Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640,
1646 (2010); Gatti v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 415 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir.
2005). The Pension Plan’s definition of “Employee” as “any person engaged in
rendering personal services to the Employer for earnings considered wages under
Section 3121(a) of the [Internal Revenue] Code” can reasonably be read to refer
only to those employees on Alyeska’s payroll. The plan administrator’s decision
to adopt such an interpretation doesn’t violate ERISA’s anti-cutback provision, see
29 U.S.C. § 1054(g), as the later amendments to the plan can reasonably be read as
clarifications of the earlier language.
3. The Separation Plan administrator also didn’t abuse its discretion in
denying Reinking benefits. The plan explicitly distinguishes “regular” employees
from “non-Alyeska contract personnel.” Because Reinking was formally
employed by a series of third-party staffing firms, not Alyeska, a plan
administrator could reasonably conclude that he falls into the latter category.
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page 4
The district court shall enter summary judgment for defendants.
REVERSED.
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Reinking v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., No. 11-35363
BERZON, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting:
I respectfully dissent as to the pension plan benefits but concur with regard
to the separation benefits.
For the reasons explained by the district court, the plan administrator’s
interpretation of the phrase “any person engaged in rendering personal services to
the Employer for earnings considered wages under Section 3121(a) of the [Internal
Revenue] Code” was an abuse of discretion. In addition, the plan’s separate
reference to leased employees would be superfluous were Alyeska’s interpretation
of the 1989 definition of “Employee” correct. See, e.g., Brown v. S. Cal. IBEW-
NECA Trust Funds, 588 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[E]ach provision in an
agreement should be construed consistently with the entire document such that no
provision is rendered nugatory.” (internal quotation marks omitted). I would
therefore affirm the district court as to the pension benefits.
FILED
AUG 29 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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