Christopher A. Geier v. STREUKER, Dr., DDS

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHRISTOPHER A. GEIER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
STREUKER, Dr., DDS,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 12-16288
D.C. No. 3:10-cv-01965-SI
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Susan Illston, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 10, 2013**
Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
Christopher A. Geier, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. We have jurisdiction under 28
FILED
JUN 17 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir.
2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Geier failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant’s actions did not
reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d
802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (a prisoner plaintiff “bears the burden of pleading and
proving the absence of legitimate correctional goals for the conduct he complains
of”); cf. Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that
prisons must provide “a system of ready access to adequate dental care”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in staying discovery pending
resolution of defendant’s summary judgment motion. See Dunn v. Castro, 621
F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Qualified immunity confers upon officials a
right, not merely to avoid standing trial, but also to avoid the burdens of such
pretrial matters as discovery.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see
also Alaska Cargo Transp., Inc. v. Alaska R.R. Corp., 5 F.3d 378, 383 (9th Cir.
1993) (setting forth applicable standard of review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Geier’s motion to
reconsider its summary judgment because Geier failed to establish any basis for
reconsideration. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5

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F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion and
setting forth grounds for reconsideration). Accordingly, the district court properly
denied Geier’s post-judgment motion to amend his complaint. See Lindauer v.
Rogers, 91 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[O]nce judgment has been entered in
a case, a motion to amend the complaint can only be entertained if the judgment is
first reopened under a motion brought under Rule 59 or 60.”).
Geier’s motion to correct the record is denied. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(e);
Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 351 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[N]ormally the
reviewing court will not supplement the record on appeal with material not
considered by the trial court.”).
AFFIRMED.

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