United States of America v. Ernest Chrzaszcz

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral
argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Carlos F. Lucero, Circuit Judge for the Tenth Circuit,
sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ERNEST CHRZASZCZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 12-10102
D.C. No. CR 09-1381-PHX-JAT
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
James T. Teilborg, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 6, 2013 **
Pasadena, California
Before: TROTT, LUCERO,*** and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Ernest Chrzaszcz appeals his conviction for conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute heroin, cocaine, and marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846,
FILED
JUN 17 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2
841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A), and his convictions for possession with intent to
distribute heroin, cocaine, and marijuana, all in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
and 841 (b)(1)(A). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
Chrzaszcz argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
convict. We review claims of insufficient evidence de novo. United States v.
Duran, 189 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999). The dispositive question is whether,
construing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). “To establish a
drug conspiracy, the government must prove: 1) an agreement to accomplish an
illegal objective; and 2) the intent to commit the underlying offense.” United
States v. Iriarte-Ortega, 113 F.3d 1022, 1024 (9th Cir. 1997), amended by 127 F.3d
1200 (9th Cir. 1997). To prove possession with intent to distribute, the
government must show that “the defendant (1) knowingly (2) possessed the [drug]
(3) with intent to distribute it.” United States v. Mora, 876 F.2d 76, 77 (9th Cir.
1989).
Chrzaszcz was apprehended as the passenger of a truck carrying large
amounts of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. He asserts that the only evidence that
he was aware of the truck’s cargo was a coconspirator’s “bare assertion that ‘he

-- 2 of 3 --

3
knew.’” We reject Chrzaszcz’s characterization of the evidence. Two
coconspirators confirmed that Chrzaszcz knew of the drugs in the truck. One of
these coconspirators testified that he personally discussed drug trafficking plans
with Chrzaszcz. The government also introduced a recorded phone conversation in
which Chrzaszcz discussed cocaine prices with a coconspirator and testimony from
law enforcement officers who observed Chrzaszcz taking delivery of marijuana
several days prior to his arrest, among other evidence.
Viewing the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the
government, we conclude that the jury could have rationally concluded that the
government proved each of the essential elements of the charged crimes beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --