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11-55717•Susan V. Klat v. Mitchell Repair Information Company, LLC; Snap-on Incorporated
11-55717Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitJun 17, 2013
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SUSAN V. KLAT,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MITCHELL REPAIR INFORMATION
COMPANY, LLC; SNAP-ON
INCORPORATED,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-55717
D.C. No. 3:10-cv-00100-JM-CAB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Jeffrey T. Miller, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 10, 2013**
Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
Susan V. Klat appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
her employment action alleging retaliatory discharge in violation of Title VII. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Vasquez v. County
FILED
JUN 17 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS
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11-55717 2
of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Klat failed to
raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to the first element of her prima facie
case of retaliation, that is, whether she was engaged in a protected activity under
Title VII at the time of her termination. See id. at 646 (setting forth elements of a
prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII); Learned v. Bellevue, 860 F.2d 928,
932-33 (9th Cir. 1988) (to survive summary judgment, employee must raise a
triable dispute that, at the time of termination, her “opposition” to or
“participation” in certain conduct was reasonably perceived to fall within the
protection of Title VII).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Klat’s motion for
disqualification because Klat failed to establish that the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. See Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir.
2008) (setting forth standard of review over disqualification motions and grounds
for recusal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455(a)).
Klat’s contentions regarding the district court’s alleged failure to review the
entire record are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
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