Manse Sullivan v. T. P. Ryan;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MANSE SULLIVAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
T. P. RYAN; et al.,
Defendants,
and
EDWARD FLORES, Chief; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-17506
D.C. No. 5:04-cv-02089-EJD
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Edward J. Davila, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 19, 2012**
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
FILED
JAN 02 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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11-17506 2
Manse Sullivan appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations while he was
confined in Santa Clara County Jail awaiting civil commitment proceedings
pursuant to California’s Sexually Violent Predator Act. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 926
(9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Sullivan’s claim
against defendant Connor because Sullivan failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether his confinement in administrative segregated housing
served legitimate, non-punitive governmental interests. See id. at 932 (analyzing
conditions of confinement for civil detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment and
stating that civil detainees may be subject to “[l]egitimate, non-punitive
government interests” such as “maintaining jail security, and effective management
of [the] detention facility”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Sullivan’s claim
against defendants Burden and Tarabetz for deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs because Sullivan failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as
to whether these defendants were “aware of facts from which the inference could
be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists” and then “also dr[e]w the

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11-17506 3
inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); see Johnson v. Meltzer,
134 F.3d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir. 1998) (Eighth Amendment establishes minimum
standard of medical care for pretrial detainees).
The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants Wong
and Flores because Sullivan failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether these defendants personally participated in any constitutional violations.
See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (supervisors are liable for
constitutional violations of subordinates only if they “participated in or directed the
violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them”).
Contrary to Sullivan’s contentions, the district court did not error in applying
the doctrine of issue preclusion, which is distinct from the doctrine of claim
preclusion. See White v. City of Pasadena, 671 F.3d 918, 926-27 (9th Cir. 2012)
(explaining the difference between claim and issue preclusion).
Sullivan’s contention that the district court was biased is unpersuasive
because Sullivan fails to point to any evidence in the record of judicial bias.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett
v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.

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