United States of America v. Terry Lee Franklin

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, Senior District Judge for the U.S.**
District Court for the District of South Dakota, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TERRY LEE FRANKLIN,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 11-50505
D.C. No. 2:07-cr-00967-PSG-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 12, 2012
Pasadena, California
Before: PREGERSON and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and PIERSOL, Senior
District Judge.**
Terry Franklin appeals the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss for
post-indictment delay, the district court’s denial of his suppression motion, and his
FILED
DEC 18 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a). We affirm the district court on all three
matters.
Franklin’s motion to dismiss was based on the Sixth Amendment right to a
speedy trial. In this case, the length and reasons for delay do not excuse Franklin
from showing actual, non-speculative prejudice. See United States v. Beamon, 992
F.2d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[W]e must consider the amount of delay in
relation to particularized prejudice.”). Franklin cannot show that his trial’s delay
caused him such prejudice. As a result, the delay between Franklin’s indictment,
arrest, and trial did not violate his Sixth Amendment speedy-trial rights. We affirm
the district court’s denial of Franklin’s motion to dismiss.
We also affirm the district court’s denial of Franklin’s suppression motion.
We find that the circumstances created reasonable suspicion for an “investigatory
stop,” or Terry stop, of Franklin. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev.,
542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004). The accompanying frisk was appropriate under the
circumstances.
Finally, for the reasons enumerated by the district court, we affirm
Franklin’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a). United States v. Franklin, CR
07-967 PSG, 2011 WL 3424448 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011).
AFFIRM.

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