Mary W. Barton v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARY W. BARTON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
the Social Security Administration,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 11-36027
D.C. No. 3:11-cv-05206-JPD
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
James P. Donohue, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 4, 2012**
Seattle, Washington
Before: SCHROEDER, McKEOWN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Claimant Mary Barton appeals from the judgment of the district court
affirming the Commissioner’s final decision that Barton was not disabled under
FILED
DEC 06 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Title II of the Social Security Act. Barton argues that the ALJ erred in assessing
her credibility, erred in giving little weight to the opinion of her treating physician
Dr. Sharman Hurlow, M.D., and improperly discounted the opinions of lay
witnesses. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
This Court reviews de novo a district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner’s denial of social security benefits and reverses only if the ALJ’s
decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole or if
the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110
(9th Cir. 2012). Substantial evidence means “‘such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Valentine v.
Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Desrosiers
v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988)). The
evidence must be “more than a mere scintilla,” but may be less than a
preponderance. Id. The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving
conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving any other ambiguities that might
exist. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). When the evidence
is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the Commissioner’s
conclusion that must be upheld. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir.
2002).

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Reviewing the Commissioner’s decision in light of the record, we hold that
the ALJ’s findings regarding Barton’s credibility, the opinion of Barton’s treating
physician, and the lay witness testimony were supported by substantial evidence
and were not based on legal error. The ALJ’s finding that Barton contradicted
herself in her testimony is a specific, clear, and convincing basis supporting the
adverse credibility determination. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1283–84 (9th
Cir. 1996). Contradictions between Dr. Hurlow’s treatment notes and subsequent
opinion provide sufficient bases for giving little weight to the physician’s opinion.
Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008). The ALJ’s finding that
the lay opinion testimony conflicted with the medical evidence was a “germane
reason[]” for rejecting this testimony. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218
(9th Cir. 2005).
AFFIRMED.

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