Renee Stephens v. State of Oregon, by and through its Judicial Department;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RENEE STEPHENS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
STATE OF OREGON, by and through its
Judicial Department; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-35971
D.C. No. 3:11-cv-01013-HU
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael H. Simon, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 13, 2012**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Renee Stephens appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that six current and former state court judges
violated his state and federal constitutional rights by ruling against him in a prior
FILED
NOV 20 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d
1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order). We may affirm on any ground supported by
the record. Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We
affirm.
Dismissal was proper because Stephen’s action is barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003) (“If a
federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state
court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision, Rooker-
Feldman bars subject matter jurisdiction in federal district court.”).
Moreover, the district court properly dismissed Stephens’s action because
defendants are immune from liability. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (barring injunctive
relief against judicial officers for their judicial conduct “unless a declaratory decree
was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable”); Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d
1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2006) (judges are absolutely immune from suits for damages
based on their judicial conduct except when acting “in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Fireman’s Fund
Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, 302 F.3d 928, 957 n.28 (9th Cir. 2002) (“‘The Eleventh

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Amendment bars suits which seek either damages or injunctive relief against a
state . . . .’” (citation omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing without leave to
amend because the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. See Lopez v. Smith,
203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (setting forth standard of review
and explaining that leave to amend should be given unless the deficiencies in the
complaint cannot be cured by amendment).
AFFIRMED.

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