ROBIN BLAKE COMBS, Sr. v. JOSEPH D. LEHMAN, Secretary;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBIN BLAKE COMBS, Sr.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
JOSEPH D. LEHMAN, Secretary; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-35083
D.C. No. 3:08-cv-05063-RJB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 13, 2012**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Washington state prisoner Robin Blake Combs, Sr., appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
FILED
NOV 20 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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§ 1291. We review de novo. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2004)
(dismissal on the basis of the applicable statute of limitations); Toguchi v. Chung,
391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004) (summary judgment); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315
F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003) (dismissal for failure to exhaust). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed without prejudice Combs’ mattress
claim because Combs failed to exhaust prison grievance procedures concerning
that claim. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85, 93-95 (2006) (exhaustion is
mandatory and must be done in a timely manner consistent with prison policies).
The district court properly dismissed as time-barred those claims for which
Combs exhausted his administrative remedies more than three years before filing
his complaint. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080 (three-year statute of limitations
for personal injury actions); Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 943 (9th Cir. 2005)
(“[T]he applicable statute of limitations must be tolled while a prisoner completes
the mandatory exhaustion process.”); Jones, 393 F.3d at 927 (“For actions under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal
injury actions[.]”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Combs’ remaining
claims regarding medical treatment because Combs failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to

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his chronic back pain. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (“[T]o prevail on a claim
involving choices between alternative courses of treatment, a prisoner must show
that the chosen course of treatment was medically unacceptable under the
circumstances, and was chosen in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [the
prisoner’s] health.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Combs’ remaining contentions regarding his objection to the district court’s
denial of his second supplemental motion requesting disclosure of defendants’
addresses are unpersuasive.
Combs’ motion to stay proceedings, filed on April 9, 2012, is denied as
unnecessary.
AFFIRMED.

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