Troyce Tabitha Braninburg v. Monterey County;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TROYCE TABITHA BRANINBURG,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MONTEREY COUNTY; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-15557
D.C. No. 4:08-cv-04562-CW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Claudia Wilken, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 9, 2012**
Before: THOMAS, RAWLINSON, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Troyce Tabitha Braninburg appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various constitutional violations
in connection with her confinement in Monterey County Jail while awaiting civil
FILED
OCT 24 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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commitment proceedings pursuant to California’s Sexually Violent Predator
(“SVP”) Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant Fithian
because Braninburg failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether Fithian was deliberately indifferent to Braninburg’s serious medical needs,
or whether Fithian personally participated in any other alleged constitutional
violations. See Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986) (pretrial
detainee’s claim for inadequate medical treatment is evaluated under Eighth
Amendment standard, and jail personnel violate the Eighth Amendment “if they
are deliberately indifferent to the [detainee’s] serious medical needs”); see also
Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (an official can be liable under
§ 1983 only “if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative
acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the
deprivation” at hand (emphasis omitted)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants
Kanalakis and Barrera because Braninburg failed to establish a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether these defendants personally participated in any
constitutional violations. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989)

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(supervisor is liable for constitutional violations of subordinates only if he
“participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to
act to prevent them”); see also Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989)
(party opposing summary judgment must present “significant probative evidence
tending to support its claim that material, triable issues of fact remain”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Braninburg’s
request for additional time for discovery because Braninburg failed to show how
allowing additional discovery would have precluded summary judgment. See
Jones, 393 F.3d at 930-31.
Braninburg’s contention that the district court improperly tried to require her
to exhaust administrative remedies is unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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