Darryl Lee Dunsmore v. San Diego County Sheriff’s Department;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DARRYL LEE DUNSMORE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-57141
D.C. No. 3:11-cv-00083-IEG-
WVG
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Irma E. Gonzalez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 10, 2012**
Before: WARDLAW, CLIFTON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Darryl Lee Dunsmore appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
constitutional violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
FILED
SEP 25 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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11-57141 2
review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d
443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Dunsmore’s deliberate indifference
claims because Dunsmore failed to allege facts in his second amended complaint
sufficient to demonstrate that defendants’ allegedly routine delays in providing him
with his prescribed arthritis medication manifested deliberate indifference. See
Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004) (prison officials act
with deliberate indifference only if they know of and disregard an excessive risk to
a prisoner’s health, and a showing of medical malpractice or negligence is
insufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment violation).
The district court properly dismissed Dunsmore’s retaliation claims because
Dunsmore failed to allege sufficient facts to connect alleged acts of retaliation with
the exercise of his First Amendment rights. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559,
567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth the elements of a First Amendment retaliation
claim); Resnick, 213 F.3d at 449.
The district court properly dismissed Dunsmore’s claims against the
supervisory defendants because Dunsmore failed to allege facts in his second
amended complaint sufficient to demonstrate either the supervisors’ personal
involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivations or a sufficient causal

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connection between any supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional
violations. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth
requirements for supervisory liability).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dunsmore’s motion
to reconsider because Dunsmore failed to demonstrate any ground for relief. See
Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63
(9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for relief).
We need not consider Dunsmore’s contentions concerning exhaustion of
administrative remedies because the district court did not ultimately dismiss on that
basis.
Dunsmore’s appeal of the denial of his motions for a preliminary injunction
is moot. See SEC v. Mount Vernon Mem’l Park, 664 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir.
1982) (futile to review a district court’s ruling on a request for preliminary relief
where the district court has already issued a decision on the merits).
Dunsmore’s motion for further enforcement of declaratory order, filed on
August 17, 2012, is denied.
AFFIRMED.

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