Lambert George Chambers v. J. DANE, Correctional Officer;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LAMBERT GEORGE CHAMBERS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
J. DANE, Correctional Officer; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-15068
D.C. No. 3:09-cv-01382-RS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Richard Seeborg, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 26, 2012**
Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
Lambert George Chambers, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from
the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
constitutional violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
FILED
JUL 17 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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11-15068 2
review de novo a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds, Cholla Ready Mix,
Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Chambers’s action as barred by the
applicable two-year statute of limitations because, at the latest, his claims were
tolled until his administrative proceedings ended in January 2007, and he did not
file this action until May 2009. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (two-year statute
of limitations for personal injury actions); Cholla Ready Mix, 382 F.3d at 974
(§ 1983 claims are governed by forum state’s statute of limitations for personal
injury actions); see also Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 943 (9th Cir. 2005) (“the
applicable statute of limitations must be tolled while a prisoner completes the
mandatory exhaustion process”). Chambers has not asserted any basis for
equitable tolling or equitable estoppel. See Lukovsky v. City & County of San
Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing grounds for tolling or
estoppel).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Chambers’s motion
for reconsideration because Chambers failed to establish grounds for such relief.
See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63
(9th Cir. 1993) (reviewing denial of reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)
and 60(b) for an abuse of discretion and setting forth requirements).

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11-15068 3
Chambers’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
Chambers’s motion to proceed, filed on April 16, 2012, is denied as
unnecessary.
AFFIRMED.

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