United States of America v. Wallene Mary Bear

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The Honorable Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate Justice of the United**
States Supreme Court (Ret.), sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WALLENE MARY BEAR,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 10-30317
D.C. No. 4:10-cr-00056-SEH-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding
Argued September 1, 2011
Submitted June 21, 2012
Missoula, Montana
Before: O’CONNOR, Associate Justice, REINHARDT and THOMAS, Circuit**
Judges.
FILED
JUN 21 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Wallene Bear appeals from her convictions for violations of 21 U.S.C. § 846
and § 846(a)(1) after entry of a conditional guilty plea. We affirm. Because the
parties are familiar with the history of this case, we need not recount it here.
Under the circumstances presented by this case, we conclude that the district
court did not commit reversible error in denying the suppression motion. We
review de novo a district court’s denial of a suppression motion. United States v.
Ruiz, 428 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 2005). We review the district court’s factual
findings for clear error. Id.
It is undisputed that the driver gave consent to search the automobile where
the contraband was discovered in a purse. The district court did not clearly err in
its factual finding that the purse was under the joint control of the driver and the
defendant, and that each had joint access to it. Given that finding, the district court
did not err in denying the suppression motion. See United States v. Matlock, 415
U.S. 164, 171 (1974) (“[W]hen the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless
search by proof of voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that consent was
given by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was obtained from
a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship
to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.”)

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The district court also did not err in denying the motion to suppress
contraband discovered in a strip search at the detention facility. The government
had reliable information that the defendant was in possession of drugs, drug
paraphernalia had been discovered in her purse, and she had previously hidden
contraband in her body cavities. Further, at the detention facility, the defendant’s
co-arrestee was observed on closed circuit camera twice reaching into the
defendant’s bra for objects that had been hidden there. Given these undisputed
facts, the district court did not err in concluding that the strip search was justified
and conducted in a constitutionally permissible manner. See Kennedy v. Los
Angeles Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 702, 712, 715-16 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that
warrantless strip searches of felony suspects are permissible if justified by a
reasonable suspicion that drugs or weapons are being smuggled into a detention
facility), implicitly overruled on other grounds by Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224
(1991) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.

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