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11-35246•Tracy Sisson v. Michael J. Astrue
11-35246Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitJun 14, 2012
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The Honorable Janet C. Hall, United States District Judge for the**
District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.
1
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TRACY SISSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 11-35246
D.C. No. 3:09-cv-05738-RBL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 6, 201*
Seattle, Washington
Before: SILVERMAN and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and HALL, District
Judge.**
Tracy Sisson appeals the denial of her application for disability benefits. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court's
FILED
JUN 14 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CL
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE A
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decision upholding the Commissioner's denial of benefits de novo. Edlund v.
Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). We reverse the administrative
law judge's decision only when it is not supported by substantial evidence or is
based on legal error. Id.
Sisson contends that the ALJ committed legal error by failing to fully credit
her testimony about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her tremors.
We agree. The ALJ should not have discounted Sisson’s testimony about the
limiting effects of her tremors based on her reported activities because none of the
evidence in the record contradicts her assertion that her tremors are only
intermittently severely limiting. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir.
1995).
Next, Sisson contends that the ALJ’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
assessment is not supported by substantial evidence. We agree. The ALJ did not
set forth legitimate reasons for attributing limited weight to Dr. Duckworth’s
opinion that Sisson is limited to sedentary exertion by her cerebral palsy. Tackett
v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1999); Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. The
ALJ also failed to provide specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial
evidence to reject Dr. Wheeler’s diagnosis of borderline intellectual functioning.
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Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1102-03; Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. Lastly, the ALJ erred by
failing to address or resolve the potential conflict between the testimony of Gail
Sisson and Dr. Kesting. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001).
Other errors made by the ALJ in determining Sisson’s RFC were harmless.
Specifically, the ALJ’s mischaracterization of Sisson’s cerebral palsy as historical
and his mistake in recounting the results of Dr. Kesting’s spelling examination are
both harmless error. Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th
Cir. 2006).
Sisson contends that the ALJ made further errors in determining her RFC by
failing to mention specific pieces of evidence from the reports of Dr. Mayers, Dr.
Bremer, Dr. Downes, and Gail Sisson. The evidence to which Sisson points would
not have added significant, probative value when considered in conjunction with
other evidence that the ALJ discusses, and therefore the ALJ was not required to
discuss these pieces of evidence specifically. Vincent ex rel. Vincent v. Heckler,
739 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984).
Finally, Sisson contends that the ALJ erred by determining that she could
return to her past relevant work as a housekeeper, because he made that
determination without establishing that such work constituted substantial gainful
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activity. Although we decline to decide this issue because it was not raised before
the district court, we are troubled by the ALJ’s failure to properly address the
record on whether Sisson’s past relevant work constituted substantial gainful
activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574(b)(3); Lewis, 236 F.3d at 515-16.
In light of these errors, we reverse the decision of the district court and
instruct it to remand this case to the ALJ for further determinations consistent with
this decision.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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