Angela D. Hobson; Aderus D. Milan v. Hsc Real Estate, Inc.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANGELA D. HOBSON; ADERUS D.
MILAN,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
HSC REAL ESTATE, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 11-35311
D.C. No. 2:09-cv-00361-RSM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ricardo S. Martinez, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 11, 2012
Seattle, Washington
Before: HAWKINS, BYBEE, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Angela Hobson (“Hobson”) and Aderus Milan (“Milan”) appeal the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in their housing discrimination action brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and related Washington state law claims. Reviewing the grant
FILED
MAY 22 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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of summary judgment de novo, Las Vegas Sands, LLC v. Nehme, 632 F.3d 526, 532
(9th Cir. 2011), we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
1. Section 1981 Claims
In discrimination cases, “very little evidence” is required for plaintiffs to
survive summary judgment, since “the ultimate question is one that can only be
resolved through a ‘searching inquiry’—one that is most appropriately conducted by
the factfinder, upon a full record.” Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d 919, 930 (9th Cir.
2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). One way a plaintiff alleging discrimination
can defeat a motion for summary judgment is by producing direct evidence
demonstrating that a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated the
defendant. McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004).
The property manager’s statements about Milan’s anticipated exit from the
apartment evince racial animus bearing a sufficient nexus to the challenged housing
decisions to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that a discriminatory reason more
likely than not motivated HSC’s denial of Milan’s tenancy application and eviction

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HSC argues that these statements constitute inadmissible hearsay. But the1
district court did not abuse its discretion in including them in the summary judgment
record, see Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D) (describing as “not hearsay” statements offered
against an opposing party and made by that party’s employee within the scope of the
employment), and we therefore consider them on appeal. ACLU of Nev. v. City of Las
Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that evidentiary rulings made in
the context of summary judgment are reviewed for an abuse of discretion).
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of Hobson. See Metoyer, 504 F.3d at 937-38 (combining evidence raising a triable1
issue of fact regarding supervisor’s role in decision to fire African-American plaintiff
with evidence of supervisor’s discriminatory remarks regarding African-Americans
to conclude that plaintiff presented direct evidence sufficient to survive summary
judgment). We therefore reverse the adverse grant of summary judgment on Hobson’s
and Milan’s § 1981 claims.
2. State Law Claims
Hobson’s and Milan’s Washington state law claims are subject to a three-year
statute of limitations. See Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 786 (Wash. 2004)
(citing Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2)). Because Hobson and Milan have not
explained why HSC’s denial of Milan’s tenancy application or eviction of Hobson
constitute anything other than discrete acts, the continuing violation doctrine is
inapplicable. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 108-13, 115
(2002); Antonius v. King Cnty., 103 P.3d 729, 736 (Wash. 2005).

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HSC denied Milan’s application on February 1, 2006, more than three years
before Appellants filed suit in the district court. Appellants’ equitable tolling
arguments rest on assertions unsupported by citations to the record. The district court
therefore correctly dismissed Milan’s and Hobson’s claims related to the denial of
Milan’s application as time-barred.
The district court properly reached the merits of Hobson’s state law claims
relating to her eviction, since HSC initiated eviction proceedings within the three-year
limitations period.
For the same reasons given above regarding direct evidence of discrimination,
we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Hobson’s state law race
discrimination claim. See Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co., 172 P.3d 688, 698 (Wash.
2007) (three-part McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis does not apply where
plaintiff supports Washington Law Against Discrimination claim with direct evidence
of discrimination).
We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Hobson’s
disability discrimination claim, since Appellants have not developed an argument
challenging that decision. James River Ins. Co. v. Herbert Schenk, P.C., 523 F.3d
915, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding waived arguments not adequately presented in
briefs).

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Costs on appeal are awarded to appellants.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for proceedings
consistent with this disposition.

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11-35311 Hobson v. HSC Real Estate, Inc.
BYBEE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I would affirm the judgment in its entirety for the reasons stated by the
district court.
FILED
MAY 22 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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