Peter Leroy Goolsby v. Darren Raney, individually

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PETER LEROY GOOLSBY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
DARREN RANEY, individually and as
the Chief of Police and as agent of the City
of Livingston; GLENN FARRELL,
Captain, individually and as agent of the
City of Livingston; JOSEPH HARRIS,
Officer, individually and as agent of the
City of Livingston; JAY O’NEILL,
Captain, individually and as agent of Park
County; CLARK CARPENTER,
individually and as agent and Sheriff of
Park County; THE CITY OF
LIVINGSTON, a political subdivision of
the State of Montana; PARK COUNTY, a
political subdivision of the State of
Montana,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-35285
D.C. No. 1:08-cv-00111-CSO
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Carolyn S. Ostby, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
FILED
MAY 21 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Former Rule 56(f) now appears as Rule 56(d) after an amendment to the1
Federal Rules of Evidence.
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Submitted May 9, 2012**
Seattle, Washington
Before: HAWKINS, GOULD, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Peter Leroy Goolsby (“Goolsby”) appeals the district court’s grants of summary
judgment to defendants on his state and federal claims stemming from his traffic stop,
arrest, detention, and prosecution in Park County, Montana. He also appeals the
district court’s partial denial of his motion for an extension of time to conduct
additional discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). Because he
has not met his evidentiary burdens, we affirm the district court.
I. Rule 56(f) Motion
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying in part Goolsby’s Rule
56(f) motion for an extension of time to conduct additional discovery. Goolsby has1
not shown that “the facts sought exist [or that] the sought-after facts are essential to
oppose summary judgment.” Family Home & Fin. Ctr., Inc. v. Fed. Home Loan
Mortg. Corp., 525 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2008).

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II. Grant of Qualified Immunity on Federal Claims
The district court properly granted qualified immunity to Livingston Police
Department officials Darren Raney (“Raney”), Glenn Farrell (“Farrell”), and Joseph
Harris (“Harris”) because Goolsby has not shown that any conduct attributable to
them “violate[d] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.” Pearson v.
Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (citation omitted).
III. Summary Judgment to Park County Defendants
The district court properly granted summary judgment on all claims to Park
County Sheriff Clark Carpenter, Park County Captain Jay O’Neill, and Park County
(collectively, “Park County Defendants”).
Summary judgment was proper on Goolsby’s medical needs claims because he
has not shown that prison officials exhibited “deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Similarly, summary
judgment in favor of defendants on Goolsby’s negligence claims with respect to
medical needs was proper because he has not shown how any duty was breached by
Park County Defendants, nor any damages, nor how any alleged breach caused any
alleged damages, as required by Montana law. See, e.g., Fisher v. Swift Transp. Co.,
181 P.3d 601, 606 (Mont. 2008).

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Because Goolsby’s federal constitutional challenges to his conditions of2
confinement fail, so too do his Montana constitutional challenges. See, e.g, Wilson
v. State, 249 P.3d 28, 33 (Mont. 2010) (“We look to federal law for guidance on the
issue of cruel and unusual punishment.”).
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Summary judgment in favor of Park County Defendants was also proper on
Goolsby’s state and federal claims concerning jail conditions because, even taking
them as true, they do not amount to “extreme deprivations” of the “minimal civilized
measures of life’s necessities” occurring through the “deliberate indifference” of
prison personnel or officers. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (citations
omitted); see Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302–03. Goolsby’s other state and2
federal claims against the Park County Defendants are also without merit.
Given that summary judgment was proper as to all of Goolsby’s substantive
claims, his claims for emotional distress and punitive damages also necessarily fail.
IV. Motion to Quash
It was within the district court’s broad discretion over discovery to grant
Farrell’s and Harris’s motion to quash discovery as it pertained to their personnel files.
The materials contained in the files were properly deemed not “relevant” for the
purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1)—that is, not “reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Surfvivor Media, Inc. v.
Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

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V. Summary Judgment to City of Livingston as to All Claims
The grant of summary judgment to the City of Livingston (“City”) as to all state
and federal claims was also proper. Per above, Goolsby failed to show any violation
of his constitutional rights at the hands of Raney, Farrell, Harris, or any other City
official, let alone a City policy that might have been responsible for any alleged
violation, as is required for municipal liability in Section 1983 actions. See Long v.
Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). Goolsby’s argument as
it pertains to the district court’s grant of summary judgment on his state law claims
against the City fails because he similarly failed to show any violations of state law
by any City officials.
VI. Conclusion
Because Goolsby has not made a showing of any genuine issue of material fact
as to any of his state or federal claims against any of the defendants, the district court
ruling is AFFIRMED.

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