Tommy Simmons, Iii v. County of Los Angeles;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TOMMY SIMMONS, III,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 10-56414
D.C. No. 2:04-cv-09731-SVW-JC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 17, 2012**
Before: LEAVY, PAEZ, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Tommy Simmons, III, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging malicious prosecution. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Blankenhorn v. City of
FILED
APR 27 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 470 (9th Cir. 2007), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants Harris
and Taylor in their individual capacities as to Simmons’ malicious prosecution
claim because Simmons failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether these defendants interfered with the prosecutor’s independent judgment in
initiating criminal proceedings, and whether they acted with the purpose of
denying Simmons a fair trial or violating another constitutional right. See Lacey v.
Maricopa County, 649 F.3d 1118, 1133 (9th Cir. 2011) (elements of a malicious
prosecution claim under § 1983); Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010,
1027 (9th Cir. 2008) (presumption that prosecutor’s filing of a criminal complaint
immunizes investigating officers unless “substantial” evidence shows that “‘the
district attorney was pressured or caused by the investigating officers to act
contrary to his independent judgment’” (citation omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Simmons’ motion
to file a third amended complaint. See Chodos v. W. Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992,
1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth the standard of review and requirements for
leave to amend, and noting that a district court’s discretion is particularly broad
where it has already granted leave to amend).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

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in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009)
(per curiam).
Simmons’ remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
Simmons’ motion for a status update on this appeal is denied as moot.
AFFIRMED.

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