THOMAS G. JUNGHANS; RODERICK R. McBROOM v. DAVID M. REAVES, Chapter 7 Trustee

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
THOMAS G. JUNGHANS; RODERICK
R. McBROOM,
Appellants,
v.
DAVID M. REAVES, Chapter 7 Trustee,
Appellee,
12 PERCENT FUND I LLC; COYOTE
GROWTH MANAGEMENT LLC,
Debtors - Appellees.
No. 10-17190
D.C. No. 2:10-cv-00375-ROS
MEMORANDUM*
RODERICK R. McBROOM; THOMAS
G. JUNGHANS,
Appellants,
v.
DAVID M. REAVES, Chapter 7 Trustee,
Appellee,
No. 11-15988
D.C. No. 2:10-cv-00375-ROS
FILED
APR 27 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

-- 1 of 4 --

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
10-17190 2
12 PERCENT FUND I LLC; COYOTE
GROWTH MANAGEMENT LLC,
Debtors - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Roslyn O. Silver, Chief Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 17, 2012**
Before: LEAVY, PAEZ, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
In these consolidated appeals, Roderick R. McBroom and Thomas G.
Junghans appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment affirming the bankruptcy
court’s judgment allowing the bankruptcy trustee to avoid their judgment liens
against estate property. They also appeal from the district court’s order denying
their motion for a stay pending appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(d). We review independently the bankruptcy court’s decision, without
deference to the district court’s determinations. Leichty v. Neary (In re Strand),
375 F.3d 854, 857 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm No. 11-15988 and dismiss No. 10-
17190.

-- 2 of 4 --

10-17190 3
Appeal No. 11-15988
The bankruptcy court properly concluded that, regardless of whether
Arizona or Colorado law applies, appellants’ judgment liens do not relate back to
the filing of the notices of lis pendens and instead were recorded within 90 days of
the filing of the bankruptcy petitions, and, thus, the judgment liens were properly
subject to avoidance under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). See Hurst Concrete Prods., Inc. v.
Lane (In re Lane), 980 F.2d 601, 604-06 (9th Cir. 1992) (under California’s lis
pendens statute, judgment relates back to the date of the recording of lis pendens
only if the judgment is entered upon those specific claims asserting any interest in
the real property); Tucson Estates, Inc. v. Superior Court, 729 P.2d 954, 957 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1986) (Arizona lis pendens statute was taken from California’s lis
pendens statute); Perry Park Country Club, Inc. v. Manhattan Sav. Bank, 813 P.2d
841, 843-44 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (when claims affecting rights in real property
are lost, any corresponding lis pendens expires).
Appeal No. 10-17190
Appellants appeal from the district court’s order denying their motion for a
stay pending their appeal of the bankruptcy court’s judgment. Because we have
resolved that appeal, there is no longer need for any stay and, thus, this appeal is
dismissed as moot. See Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514, 521 (9th

-- 3 of 4 --

10-17190 4
Cir. 1999) (“If there is no longer a possibility that an appellant can obtain relief for
his claim, that claim is moot and must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.”).
AFFIRMED AND DISMISSED.
Appeal No. 11-15988: AFFIRMED.
Appeal No. 10-17190: DISMISSED.

-- 4 of 4 --